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Abstract
The first two pieces of work in this thesis look into the strategic decision of inter-
generational educational investment and its implication to income inequality, skill
distribution and income mobility. The contribution of my work is to incorporate
matching frictions into the marriage market and analyze returns from strategic
educational investments. The mechanism in the marriage market adopted fol-
lows the spirit of the competitive search model which interprets the ‘mismatch’
phenomenon as the result of coordination frictions in the matching process. The
competitiveness and frictions in the family formation process create decreasing re-
turns to high educational investment. The more parental households who choose
high educational investment, the less is the return to high educational investment
compared to the lower alternative. The fact that rich parental households suffer
less from costly high educational investment puts the poor households at a disad-
vantage and the poor are more likely to be crowded out of the group that have
incentives to choose high investment. The model predicts that given a certain
parameter region, children of poor parents are more likely to become skilled if
the fraction of rich parental households is not too large. In a multi-generational
dynamic setting, it further implies the existence of a stationary household income
distribution and income mobility rates. An increase in returns to education alone
generates a larger stationary fraction of rich households and a larger upward in-
come mobility rate. An increase in the cost of the high educational investment
alone generates a smaller stationary fraction of rich households and a smaller
upward income mobility rate.
The third piece of work looks into the strategic interaction between passenger
carriers over product quality and the location choice in a duopoly scheduled
flight market. The model predicts that the two carriers prefer to be specialized
in different flight quality (non-stop vs. one-stop) and adopt the same schedule
when a higher quality difference makes the consumers less sensitive to the flight
frequency. It contributes to literatures on the application of two-dimensional
product differentiation in air-travel market analysis.
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This thesis provides an insight into the role played by intergenerational edu-
cational investment and family formation in the intergenerational transmission
of economic status. The next two chapters construct a theoretical framework
that investigates the competition in educational investment among parental hou-
seholds and its implications for the interaction between education cost, income
inequality and income mobility. The final chapter explores product differentiation
of industrial economics. By investigating a two-dimensional product differentia-
tion model in the air-travel market, it sheds some light on the strategic interaction
between a hub carrier and a low cost carrier over flight schedule arrangement and
flight quality choice.
1.1 Pre-match Investment Competition, Coor-
dination Frictions and Household Income Dis-
tribution Over Generations
Economists have done extensive work on income inequality. The research focus
has been extended from short-run income inequality to long-run income mobility
in recent decades. This tendency partly stems from the notion that opportunity
equality is more important than distribution equality at any given time point.
Benabou and Ok (2001) argued that individuals living in a society characterized
by a great deal of intergenerational income mobility are more tolerant of existing
income inequality than those living in a society with very little intergenerational
mobility. More recently, research on income dynamics has focused not only on
gauging the distributional impact of income changes, but also on the nature and
origin of changes in economic well-being (Fields et al, 2007).
Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) and Becker (1981) predict that intergenera-
tional mobility is affected by the propensity to invest in children, by the degree
of inheritability of endowments, and by capital market constraints that limit the
ability of families to make self-financing investments. Following this, it is widely
agreed that mobility depends essentially on investment (Gall, Legros, Newman,
2009). Among various forms of investment, education is viewed as a major chan-
nel of upward intergenerational income mobility in the modern society. Besides
financial returns from labor income generated by educational investment, other
returns from schooling has been explored in recent research. One of these re-
turns stems from the marriage market, where individuals with better educational
attainment are more attractive and are more likely to be matched with a well
educated partner (Chiappori, Iyigunm and Weiss, 2009).
Becker (1973, 1974) and the extensions (Becker, 1981; Lam, 1988) first incor-
porate the notion of assortative mating on spouse’s traits into intergenerational
mobility analysis. They consider the marriage market in a frictionless environ-
ment and the utility gained from a match surplus is transferable1.
The debate on whether marriage market should be modeled in a transferable
framework or a non-transferable framework is still undergoing. Generally spea-
king, the transferable model is practical in the analysis of marital transfers such
as dowry and bride-price which widely exist in traditional societies2.
Meanwhile, the non-transferable marriage model is used in the studies on
savings behavior by Cole and Mailath (1992), sorting in the marriage market with
frictions by Smith (2006) and so on. The model in this thesis follows the non-
transferable framework in the marriage market, where both parties in a marriage
enjoy an equal share of household production.
Though matching in reality presents a strong tendency towards assortative
matching, the ‘mismatch’3 phenomenon is also widely observed. This model
incorporates coordination frictions into the matching process to capture this phe-
nomenon and the friction becomes one of the major sources of the variation in
the intergenerational income distribution. The coordination frictions are embed-
1The concepts: transferable and non-transferable, are commonly used in matching litera-
tures, e.g. see the definition in the work by Smith (1992). Generally speaking, if the intra-match
allocation of welfare is determined exogenously or with a fixed sharing rule, matching is with
non-transferable utility so that a person cannot “compensate” a potential partner for marrying
him or her despite some negative traits; if the intra-match allocation of welfare is negotiable,
matching is with transferable utility.
2See related work by Rao (1993), Botticini and Siow (2002) etc.
3‘mismatch’ in this thesis refers to a match consisting of a skilled individual and an unskilled
individual.
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ded in a directed search (matching) model, which was initially used to model the
labor market. It is also called competitive search model following the seminal
work by Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996). A nascent version of this model can
be traced to the urn-ball matching process analyzed in the work of Montgomery
(1991) and Peters (1984, 1991).
Here is an illustration of this matching mechanism. Suppose there are m
boys who can make proposals to f girls. Their proposals arrive one by one into
girls’ mailboxes. If each boy proposes to each girl with an equal probability,
any girl gets at least one proposal with probability 1 − (1 − 1
f
)m. Taking the
limit of this expression as m and f go to infinity with q = m
f
held constant, a
fraction 1 − e−q of girls get at least one proposal in the large marriage market.
Hence, even m = f , there are some girls not receiving any proposal while some
girls receive multiple proposals. In this model, the urn-ball matching process is
applied to the first round matching with heterogeneous boys and girls who have
different educational attainment. Suppose there are m1 skilled boys (type 1) and
m2 unskilled boys (type 2). On the other side, there are f1 skilled girls (type 1)
and f2 unskilled girls (type 2). The number of type 1 boys who choose to propose
to a type 1 girl is m11, and the number of type 1 boys who choose to propose
to a type 2 girl is m12, where m11 + m12 = m1. Similarly, the number of type
2 boys who choose to propose to a type 1 girl is m21, and the number of type
2 boys who choose to propose to a type 2 girl is m22, where m21 + m22 = m2.
Girls choose type 1 boys over type 2 boys when receiving proposals from both.
Hence a type 1 girl matches with a type 1 boy with probability 1 − e
m11
f1 , and
with a type 2 boy with probability 1 − e
m12
f2 . A type 2 girl matches with a type
1 boy with probability e
m11
f1 (1 − e
m21





f2 ). Obviously, type 1 individuals have an advantage in the marriage
market both in terms of matching quality and matching probability.
Foreseeing the advantages of being a type 1 individual in the matching pro-
cess, altruistic parents have the incentive to make high educational investment to
produce type 1 offspring at the cost of their own consumption. Strategic paren-
tal investment in this model endogenizes the type distribution of the offspring’s
generation. This consideration follows a relatively young literature on strategic
pre-match investment. It is called a “matching tournament” with one-sided edu-
cational investment in the labor market following the work by Hopkins (2007), or
“pre-marital investment” with double-sided investment in the marriage market
following the work by Peters and Siow (2002). It has been argued by Bhaskar
and Hopkins (2010) that the double-sided pre-marital investment model, where
3
investment decisions are made simultaneously with complete information and
an expectation of an exogenous assortative matching outcome in the frictionless
marriage market, can lead to multiple equilibria due to the strategic interaction
between parental households with boys and these with girls. In this model, we
assume that each household has one boy and one girl, and invests the same on
both of their children regardless of their gender. As a result, it can be considered
as an equivalence to the one-sided pre-match investment model. The strategic
interaction occurs between the rich and the poor, but there is no strategic inter-
action based on the offspring’s gender. Moreover, the action space for parents is
discrete and limited to only two exogenous educational investment levels where
costs are also exogenous, which reflects that education sectors are considered as
a kind of quasi-market, for the prices and the standard of education are com-
monly influenced by public authorities (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). Strategic
concerns in pre-match investment have also been used to account for competitive
savings motives which affect the economic growth rate (Cole and Mailath 1992;
Wei and Zhang, 2011), where the matching environment is frictionless and the
matching outcome is assortative.
The contribution of this model is to examine the strategic thinking of pre-
match educational investment with a frictional family formation process and its
impact on the variation in income distribution and income mobility over genera-
tions. It suggests that the friction in the family formation process is one of the
possible factors which can break the “circulation of the elites” (Pareto, 1971).
The model also addresses the following research question: does intergenerational
educational investment increase the advantage of the rich, which contributes to
social stratification, or does it foster income mobility? The results of this model
imply that an increase in the cost of high educational investment alone would
decrease the equilibrium fraction of rich households and the upward income mo-
bility; while an increase in the return to high educational investment alone would
increase the equilibrium fraction of rich households and the upward income mo-
bility. This result is consistent with previous studies on income inequality and
income mobility4.
4See the work by Solon (2004), Corak (2006), D’Addio (2007), Andrews and Leigh (2009),
Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini(1999), Hassler, Rodŕıguez Mora and Zeira(2007).
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1.2 Product Line Competition with Vertical and
Horizontal Differentiation
Another research interest of this thesis lies in two-dimensional product differen-
tiation in the air-travel market. One-dimensional product differentiation mo-
dels are typically divided into two categories: horizontal product differentiation
(Hotelling, 1929), where consumers have different preferences over differentiated
products that are priced at the marginal cost, and vertical product differentia-
tion (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982), where consu-
mers have the same preference over differentiated products that are priced at
the marginal cost. Two-dimensional product differentiation models are addres-
sed by Neven and Thisse (1990), Economides (1989, 1993), Tabuchi (1994), and
Degryse(1996). Scheduled flights5 embody multiple characteristics. Two charac-
teristics are most important to consumers: departure times and flight duration.
Hence, a two-dimensional product differentiation model better fits the competi-
tion format among passenger carriers than a one-dimensional framework.
My third piece of work attempts to analyze the following research question in
the framework of horizontal and vertical product differentiation: how does a low
quality service (one-stop flights) provider interact with a high quality service (non-
stop flights) provider with regard to product line differentiation of the location
and the quality dimension? The results shed some light on the competition
format between a hub carrier, who may provide one-stop flight service or non-stop
flight service, and a low-cost carrier, who always provides non-stop flight service
according to its business model. With regard to this research question, Cento
(2008) investigates the price competition between these two types of carriers who
adopt complicated price schemes in various market structure, e.g. monopoly,
symmetric duopoly, asymmetric duopoly, asymmetric oligopoly, etc. Dunn (2007)
empirically examines the factors affecting the entry of non-stop services into ‘rim’
markets6. The results provide evidence on the cannibalization effect7 between
a carrier’s own one-stop services and non-stop services, which deters the hub
carrier’s entry into non-stop services in the ‘rim’ markets. In contrast to these
5The concept of a scheduled flight is in contrast to that of a charter flight. A scheduled flight,
also known as public commercial flights leave at regular intervals with tickets being purchased
up to the day of departure, while a charter flight is a private flight scheduled to meet the needs
of specific passengers.
6The routes consist of two endpoint cities which are typically connected by one-stop flights
operated by hub carriers.
7The hub carrier’s non-stop flights exert a negative effect on the hub carrier’s profits with
respect to its one-stop flights, which is considered as a form of ‘cannibalization’.
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work, the model presented in Chapter 4 focuses on the vertical and horizontal
product differentiation of flights. It does not consider any price discrimination,
neither does it consider the possibility of the hub carrier simultaneously providing
one-stop and non-stop flights. In other words, no competition between two types
of services within one carrier is studied. Moreover, the model assumes a simple
price scheme under which each carrier adopts a uniform price across its own
product line. For simplification purposes, this model analyzes a duopoly market
structure only, and analysis under other market structure could be an extension.
The flight schedule adopted by a carrier is considered to be the location of its
product line (a series of flights), which is modeled by a series of points along a
salop circle8. That is how the carriers differentiate their product line horizontally.
This model follows Klemperer (1992), where product line’s location is partially
endogenized as in the form of only two polar strategies: head-to-head or interla-
ced. This simplification is due to the complexity of endogenizing location choices
in product differentiation models. In addition, the model also endogenizes the
quality choice in the form of two possibilities, one-stop or non-stop, which gene-
rates different flight durations for any given city-pair market. Flights possess two
characteristics, so do the consumers. Consumers differ in their desired departure
time and their valuation of the flight duration.
In general, the model set-up closely follows that of Degryse (1996) on banking
industry, but differs in four key aspects. First, each of the duopolists provides
a product line rather than a single product, so that the scale of product line
matters in this analysis, which is reasonable since the frequency of flights (related
to the scale of product line) matters in air-travel market. Second, duopolists in
this model are allowed to choose their locations in two polar strategies: head-
to-head or interlaced, while the locations are fixed and exogenous in Degryse’s
banking model. This flexibility of product location fits better with the scheduled
flight market since choosing a schedule involves strategic thinking in carriers’
competition. Third, the competition between the duopolists is asymmetric in the
sense that one of them (the low-cost carrier) always provides high quality service
(non-stop flights), so it only needs to make decisions on the location. The other
player (the hub carrier), however, needs to make decisions on both the location
and the quality of its services. Finally, the players move sequentially rather than
simultaneously. This follows the conjecture that the hub carrier takes more time
in making strategic decisions on product line competition since it needs to decide
8Salop circle model is a variation of Hotelling location model. Originally, it examines consu-
mer preference with regard to geographic location.
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both the flight quality and the flight schedule while the low-cost carrier only needs
to make decisions on the schedule.
1.3 Overview of the Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 constructs a theoretical frame-
work of intergenerational educational investment and the variation in income
distribution across two generations. It characterizes the equilibrium consisting of
the parental households’ investment strategies and the corresponding matching
outcomes of their children. It also re-examines the competition of educational
investment, which affects the variation in the households’ income distribution.
It implies that sorting in the family formation process should not worry policy-
makers from the intergenerational income mobility perspective if the costs of
education investment allows enough incentives to make the high education in-
vestment.
Chapter 3 is an extension of Chapter 2. It presents a dynamic model, at-
tempting to capture the features of intergenerational educational investment, the
variation in income distribution and the mobility over many generations. In both
the static and dynamic framework, given that all the households are poor in the
first generation, there is an increase in the fraction of rich households from the
initial generation to the offspring’s generation and this fraction becomes statio-
nary in dynamic settings. The increase is larger in the dynamic setting than that
in the static setting, because when investing in education benefits many genera-
tions, the poor are better motivated to choose high educational investment. As
a result, there is a larger equilibrium fraction of rich households in the dynamic
model.
Chapter 4 studies a duopoly air-travel market between a city-pair. This chap-
ter analyzes how a hub-spoke network carrier interact with a point-to-point net-
work carrier with regard to product line arrangement and product quality choice.
Conditions are generated under which the hub carrier competes with the low-cost
carrier by providing non-stop flights along an interlaced schedule, or by providing
one-stop flights at the same schedule adopted by the low-cost carrier. It also
indicates that a larger quality difference makes the consumers less sensitive to
flight frequency. Hence the two carriers prefer to be specialized in different flight
qualities and adopt the same schedule.
7
Chapter 2
Pre-match Investment Competition and
Coordination Frictions in the Marriage Market
Abstract
This chapter considers a competitive pre-match educational investment
model. Educational investment before a match determines an individual’s
type, which is the sole quality valued by potential mates in the family for-
mation process. The model incorporates a directed matching mechanism
in the marriage market. Under the assumption of no gender bias in pa-
rents’ investment behavior, a unique symmetric equilibrium can exist both
in the matching stage and the investment stage. Matching can be mixed in
equilibrium, as can parents’ investment strategies. Hence, offspring from
the same type of parental households may end up with different educatio-
nal attainment and the same type of individuals may end up with different
types of partners. Given that the disparity in educational investment costs
and the inequality in feasible household income are constant, a smaller
fraction of rich parental households leads to a higher propensity of poor
parental households to choose the high educational investment.
Key Words: Pre-match investment, directed matching, income in-
equality
2.1 Introduction
Cross-country empirical studies in recent decades have observed that income in-
equality can be largely ascribed to the degree of skill dispersion of the labor force
(Nickell, 2004). Educational investment that aims to increase human capital is
viewed as a major channel of producing skilled individuals in modern society.
Besides the understanding of financial returns from labor market generated by
educational investments, economists are now paying more attention to other re-
turns generated by schooling which may indirectly affect an individual’s life-time
economic status. One of these returns stems from the marriage market, where in-
dividuals with better educational attainment are more attractive and more likely
to be matched with a better educated partner (Chiappori, Iyigunm and Weiss,
2009). This return is worth studying since it is a non-trivial factor in the edu-
cational investment decision making process and the family formation process,
both of which play an important role in the evolution of income distribution and
income mobility through generations.
In light of the theories of family economics, for which Becker (1973, 1974) and
the extensions (Becker, 1981; Lam, 1988) provided an important foundation, the
notion of assortative mating on spouse’s traits has been incorporated into inter-
generational income mobility analysis. Studies in other social science fields also
provide evidence that marriage has represented one of the primary institutions
by which social-economic mobility and social stratification took place in many
countries and for centuries (Goody, 1983). However, matching is not perfectly
assortative in reality. The literature on search and matching theories provides
explanations on the ‘mismatch’ phenomenon1, ascribing it to the randomness in
the matching process, which is noted as matching frictions. Generally, two types
of frictions have been paid special attention to. In the random matching fra-
mework, the matching process involves time-consuming search, which generates
search frictions in the marriage market(Burdett and Melvyn, 1997; Shimer and
Smith 2000). In the directed search (matching) framework, coordination frictions
are captured in the matching process. A directed search (matching) mechanism
has been applied in labor economics to wage dispersion studies where workers
use mixed strategies when applying for jobs, and as a result, identical workers
may get matched with different types of firms (Shi, 2001, 2002; Shimer, 2005).
Compared to the popularity of arranged marriage in traditional societies, the
1‘mismatch’ in this thesis refers to a match consisting of a skilled individual and an unskilled
individual.
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marriage market is generally decentralized in the modern society. However, there
are indeed some platforms where people are able to partly control their matching
process in order to get a better match. For example, thousands of dating web
sites and agencies use various matching algorithms to create potential matches
according to clients’ characteristics. With this observation, a directed search
model is suitable for modeling marriage market too, as it not only captures the
frictions, but also the competitiveness in the matching process. In the following
context, a directed matching mechanism is applied to establishing the first round
matching in the marriage market, and a simple random matching mechanism is
adopted in the second round to clear the marriage market. This set-up of the
matching process is to some extent reasonable in reality, as people tend to be pi-
cky in selecting a mate when they are young, but “easy going” when they become
older. Apart from an endogenous number of firms with the free entry assumption
in the models of labor economics, we assume a fixed number of marriage market
participants and a balanced sex ratio in each generation. Furthermore, any effect
on the household’s income imposed by the supply-demand conditions or strategic
interaction between workers and firms modeled in the studies of labor market
has been suppressed in this model. We simply assume an exogenous household
production technology and a fixed sharing rule which will be specified in the
following section.
Another important stream of literature related to this model is on strategic
investment before match, referred to as a “matching tournament” with one-sided
educational investment in the labor market following the work by Hopkins (2007),
or “pre-marital investment” with double-sided investment in the marriage mar-
ket following the work by Peters and Siow (2002). The educational investment
made by parents on behalf of the children before they enter the marriage market
generates two kinds of returns to altruistic parents. First, it enables children
to be more productive in the labor market so as to earn a better income. Se-
cond, it makes the children more attractive in the marriage market with a better
chance to form a high-income household. It has been argued by Bhaskar and
Hopkins (2010) that the double-sided pre-marital investment model, where in-
vestment decision makers move simultaneously with complete information and
an expectation of an exogenous assortative matching outcome in the frictionless
marriage market, can lead to multiple equilibria due to the strategic interaction
between parental households with boys and these with girls. In this model, under
the assumption that each household makes an equal educational investment on
behalf of their children, one boy and one girl, it can be considered equivalent to
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the one-sided pre-match educational investment model. The strategic interaction
exists between the rich and the poor, but there is no strategic interaction ba-
sed on offspring’s gender. Moreover, the action space for parental households is
discrete and limited to two exogenous educational investment levels where costs
are exogenously determined too. It is reasonable to have these simplifications.
First, education sectors are considered as a kind of quasi-market, for the prices
and the standard of education are commonly influenced by public authorities (Le
Grand and Bartlett, 1993). Second, “costs of investment are often rounded to
the smallest monetary denomination available (e.g. to the nearest penny)” in
reality2.
In summary, this chapter attempts to capture the strategic thinking of parents
in making pre-match educational investment and its role played in the transmis-
sion of household income distribution. The propensity to invest in children is no
longer an exogenous parameter as modeled by Becker (1979). Instead, it reflects
the competition among parental households with considerations of the conse-
quences of their investment strategies in the competitive marriage market, where
their children are forming new households. It also tries to model the marriage
market in modern society in a natural manner instead of a centralized frictionless
world that is better suited to a model of pre-industrial society. By employing a
directed matching mechanism, it is possible to focus on a mixed strategy equili-
brium, which provides intrinsic rationale of different match outcomes for identical
people other than any stochastic elements in the matching process. The indu-
ced investment strategies conducted by heterogeneous parental households can
also be mixed under certain parameter regions. Accordingly, a mixed investment
strategy in equilibrium becomes the main source of the variation in income dis-
tribution in this model. This is another departure from the previous literatures
in the sense that the family line becomes scattered either due to the uncertainty
in the investment strategies or in the matching outcomes or in both.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a general model.
Section 3 generates the equilibrium in the marriage market by incorporating a
directed matching mechanism given any exogenous skill distribution of the par-
ticipants. Section 4 traces back to the investment stage where parental house-
holds endogenize the skill distribution of their offspring by making educational
investments given any exogenous household income distribution of their own ge-
2See the similar assumption in the paper by Boudreau, J. W., “Sequential Pre-Marital In-
vestment Games: Implications for Unemployment” (2008). Economics Working Papers. Paper
200845.
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neration. Section 5 provides comparative statics, investigating the effects of the
feasible household income inequality and education cost structure on equilibrium
outcomes. Section 6 gives concluding remarks by generalizing the main findings
on the variation of income distribution.
2.2 The Model
We consider an economy composed of a balanced population, where the size of
the population is unchanged over time and the sex ratio equals one for every ge-
neration. The older generation consists of N households, each of which consists
of two parents and two children, one boy and one girl. Parental households as
the decision makers of intergenerational educational investment, are divided into
two groups, one with a high household income, recognized as the rich, and one
with a low household income, recognized as the poor. For simplicity, the educa-
tional investment options are limited to two discrete levels, denoted by the index
χ ∈ {1, 2}, both of which are available and affordable to all parental households.
The cost of education, denoted by c1 and c2, where c1 > c2, are exogenously
determined by other sectors in the economy, e.g. government’s regulation. Pa-
rents decide whether to spend a higher amount on their children’s education so
as to develop them into skilled persons (type 1) with a better income prospect
in future, or opt for a basic education, in which case their children (type 2) will
be in the low income category. Apparently, parents can increase their consump-
tion at the expense of their children’s welfare, but they are discouraged from
doing so since they are altruistic in a manner that their children’s utilities are
added into their own utilities. Assuming there is no capital accumulation over
generations, parental households’ maximizing behavior is effectively to choose an
optimal educational investment level when they are confronted with the trade-off
between their own consumption and their children’s.
To make the matching model tractable, the following assumption has been
made to ensure the symmetric educational attainment distribution between boys
and girls in the marriage market:
Assumption 1: Every parental household chooses an equal educational invest-
ment level for each of the children, without gender bias.
This assumption holds when certain conditions are met in the model. Suppose
the prospect of one’s income level only depends on one’s type (skilled if having
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a high educational attainment or unskilled if otherwise), in other words, it does
not vary across gender. Additionally the costs of educational investment do not
vary according to gender. Under these conditions, it is reasonable to assume that
altruistic parents would like to treat boys and girls equally in terms of educational
investment to maximize the sum of utilities. On the contrary, if the returns to
and/or the costs of educational investments differ by gender, this assumption will
not hold3.
This investment game consists of two stages: the investment stage where
parental households make strategic investment decisions, and the matching stage
where the young participants get matched in the marriage market. This model
can be solved by backward induction and we start from the second stage.
2.3 The Matching Stage
The population of participants in the marriage market consists of an equal mea-
sure of boys and girls, denoted by N , where N → ∞. According to assumption
1, educational attainment is symmetrically distributed across gender in the mar-
riage market. A fraction v of all the children are skilled, as their parents have
made the high educational investment for them. Use the subscripts i, j ∈ {1, 2}
to indicate boys’ and girls’ type respectively. Their type i or j, as a function
of their educational attainment χ ∈ {1, 2} is described as: i(χ) = χ, j(χ) = χ,
which indicates that the high educational investment produces a skilled indivi-
dual (type 1) while the low educational investment produces an unskilled (type
2) individual. To keep the population size unchanged, we assume that everyone
strictly prefers getting matched than being single, so that everyone will form a
household at the end of the matching stage. Their preferences over potential
mates are simplified to depend only on the potential household income following
the match.
The household production technology adopted in this model is characterized
as follows. If a couple consists of two type 1 individuals, the household will
have a high income and is categorized as a rich household, enjoying a utility ur,
where u(.) is the general utility function. u(.) is concave and strictly increasing
in its sole argument, the household income. If a couple consists of two type 2
individuals, the household will gain a low income, enjoying up and is categorized
as the poor household. If a couple consists of different types of individuals, the
household is equally likely to gain a high income or a low income (becoming rich
3See the similar assumption made in the paper by Bhaskar and Hopkins(2010).
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or poor) so that they would enjoy an expected utility (ur + up)/2. Considering
the population as a whole, it is equivalent to say, half of these the ‘mismatched’
couples are rich and half of them are poor.
The matching process adopted here takes place over two rounds. To capture
the competitive feature in the marriage market, the first round matching follows
the configuration of a directed matching model. To clear the marriage market,
the second round matching is random for those left unmatched after the first
round.
2.3.1 Directed Matching in the First Round
The first round matching mechanism is described as follows. First, the girls
simultaneously post their types and selection criteria of boys. Then the boys
decide which type of girls to propose to. Every boy proposes to one girl in this
single round. If a girl receives multiple proposals from both types of boys, type
1 boys will be selected over type 2 boys. If a girl receives multiple proposals
from the same type of boys, each boy has an equal probability of being selected.
If she receives only one proposal, she will marry this proposer without further
consideration. If no proposal arrives, she has to enter the second matching round.
Matching frictions are captured by the failure of coordination among boys due
to the large number of participants. Consequently a fraction of the participants
will be left unmatched at the end of the first round and enter the second round
where matching is random.
Before diving into the analysis of the first round matching, it would be helpful
to get some intuition of the concerns of marriage market participants by conside-
ring the two rounds matching as a whole. In the first round, boys and girls are
picky in the sense that they care about their potential partner’s type, preferring
a match that would generate a higher household income. On the other hand,
they are also afraid of being embarrassed by the matching failure and entering
the second round. To capture this, we let boys discount second round payoffs
from getting matched to zero. From a boy’s point of view in the first round, it
is better to marry a type 1 girl, but he needs to consider the competition from
other boys. Obviously, type 1 boys have an advantage over type 2 boys in the
sense that they only have to be aware of the competition within their type, while
type 2 boys have to take into consideration the competition both within their
type and that from type 1 rivals. Specifically, after choosing the type of girls, an
urn-ball matching process occurs where boys propose to a girl of the chosen type
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randomly by adopting mixed proposing strategies, which means each girl of this
type is equally likely to receive a proposal. If there are too many boys choosing to
propose to the type j girls, the chance of being selected by type j girls becomes
low. To adopt an optimal strategy of choosing the girls’ type, boys are confronted
with a trade-off between the matching quality (a better mate) and the matching
probability (possibly getting rejected in the first round and being left to the se-
cond round). While in the second round, matching is random. ‘Who marries
whom’ only depends on the chance of meeting, which is simply determined by
the distribution of the opposite gender.
The fraction of type 1 boys, as well as that of type 1 girls, is denoted by v,
which is determined by parental households’ joint investment strategies in the in-
vestment stage. Hence, v is considered as an exogenous variable in the matching
stage. Additionally, v is also the fraction of parental households who choose high
educational investment. Obviously, when v = 1, all the marriage market parti-
cipants are skilled and all the households formed through the matching process
would be rich under the assumed household production technology; when v = 0,
all of the participants are unskilled and all the households formed up would be
poor. We consider the general case where v ∈ (0, 1).
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium where boys of the same type choose
an identical strategy to decide which type of girls to propose to. Type 1 boys’
strategy, either a pure or a mixed one, is denoted by a probability, s1 ∈ [0, 1],
which measures type 1 boys’ likelihood of proposing to type 1 girls. 1−s1 denotes
type 1 boys’ likelihood of proposing to type 2 girls. In the same way, s2 ∈ [0, 1]
measures type 2 boys’ likelihood of proposing to type 1 girls, while 1−s2 denotes
their likelihood of proposing to type 2 girls. Take the population as a whole, si is
also the fraction of type i boys who actually would make proposals to type 1 girls.
1 − si is the fraction for those who would make proposals to type 2 girls. Since
any mixed strategy would not be adopted if there is a dominant pure strategy
available, conditions are established that partition the parameter space using the
criteria of whether it supports a mixed strategy or not, which will be discussed
in the next subsection.
To calculate matching probabilities, it is necessary to cite an important concept
used in search models of labor economics, the queue length, which is defined as
the expected number of workers applying to a firm. Here, the queue length of
15
type i boys proposing to type j girls is defined by qij as follows:
q11 = s1vN/vN = s1 (2.1)
q12 = (1− s1)vN/(1− v)N = (1− s1)v/(1− v) (2.2)
q21 = s2(1− v)N/vN = s2(1− v)/v (2.3)
q22 = (1− s2)(1− v)N/(1− v)N = 1− s2 (2.4)
Illustrated below is how one of the above expressions has been deduced. Others
can be deduced in a similar way. Let’s take q11 for an example. s1vN is the
number of type 1 boys who propose to type 1 girls, and vN is the total number of
type 1 girls. With the queue length defined as above, the matching probabilities
denoted by Pij (with which a type i boy proposing to a type j girl will succeed in
his endeavor) are defined as follows:









−q11(1− e−q21)/q21 = e
−s1v(1− e− s2(1−v)v )
s2(1− v) (2.7)
P22 = e




Based on the matching probabilities defined above4, it is now obvious to see
type 1 boys’ advantage over type 2 boys in the marriage market. Type 1 boys
have higher matching probabilities regardless of which type of girls they choose
to make proposals. However, every boy has to take the risk of matching failure in
this process, with its probability given by 1−Pij. Given boys’ proposing strategies
deployed, on the other side of the marriage market, a type j girl who has received
proposals, will be matched with a type i boy with probability denoted by P̃ji,
4This is an urn-ball matching process when the number of boys and girls goes to infinity
with the queue length fixed. See the explanation in the paper by Shi (2002), or in a general
survey of the search-theoretic labor market literature by Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005).
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which is defined as follows:
P̃11 = 1− e−q11 = 1− e−s1 (2.9)
P̃12 = e
−q11(1− e−q21) = e−s1 · (1− e− s2·(1−v)v ) (2.10)




−q12(1− e−q22) = e− (1−s1)·v1−v · (1− e−(1−s2)) (2.12)
1− P̃ji indicates the probability of girls’ matching failure. Since coordination
frictions exist in the matching process, it is possible that some type 1 girls would
not receive proposals from type 1 boys even if all the type 1 boys had proposed
to type 1 girls. These frictions grant type 2 boys with the opportunity to be
accepted by a type 1 girl with positive probability if they propose to her.
2.3.2 Random Matching in the Second Round
Due to coordination frictions in the first round matching, there will be a fraction
of marriage market participants left unmatched and they will enter the second
round. Random matching is adopted in the second round to clear the marriage
market. In the second round, marriage market participants are not picky anymore
and the matching probability depends only on the skill distribution of the opposite
gender.
In the random matching configuration, the probability of a girl getting mat-
ched with a type i boy denoted by P̃ sei, is identical for both types of girls, which
is the ratio of type i boys left in the second round to all the boys left in the second
round. Similarly, both types of boys will be matched with a type j girl with the
same probability in the second round, denoted by P sej , which is the ratio of type
j girls to all the girls in the second round. These probabilities are defined as
follows:
P se1 =
vN(1− P̃11 − P̃12)
vN(1 − P̃11 − P̃12) + (1− v)N(1− P̃21 − P̃22)
(2.13)
P̃ se1 =
vN(1− s∗1P11 − (1− s∗1)P12)
vN [1 − s∗1P11 − (1− s∗1)P12] + (1− v)N [1− s∗2P21 − (1− s∗2)P22]
(2.14)
where vN(1− P̃11 − P̃12) denotes the number of type 1 girls left unmatched after
the first round matching, (1− v)N(1− P̃21 − P̃22) denotes the number of type 2
girls left unmatched after the first round matching, and vN(1− P̃11− P̃12)+ (1−
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v)N(1− P̃21− P̃22) denotes the total number of girls left unmatched after the first
round matching. In the same manner, vN [1 − s∗1P11 − (1 − s∗1)P12] denotes the
number of type 1 boys left unmatched after the first round matching, (1−v)N [1−
s∗2P21−(1−s∗2)P22] denotes the number of type 2 boys left unmatched after the first
round matching, and vN [1−s∗1P11−(1−s∗1)P12]+(1−v)N [1−s∗2P21−(1−s∗2)P22]
denotes the total number of boys in the second round matching. It is obvious
that 1− P se1 = P se2, and 1− P̃ se1 = P̃ se2.
Notice that under the random matching mechanism, a boy’s matching proba-
bility with either type of girls does not depend on his own type. Unlike in the first
round with the directed matching mechanism, type 1 boys lose their advantage
in the second round, which is the same situation for type 1 girls. Throughout the
matching process, we see that those who fail in matching with a partner in the
first round will get matched in the second round, and may even form a match bet-
ter than expected in the first round. To avoid any speculation behavior over the
two rounds of matching, we assume that nobody would like to enter the second
round matching at all by setting the discount factor of the payoffs from second
round matching to be zero.
2.3.3 Equilibrium in the Marriage Market
An equilibrium in the marriage market consists of the boys’ proposing strategy,
s∗i , the probability at which a type i boy or a type j girl forms a rich household,
P ∗ir and P
∗
jr, and the fraction of rich households of the young generation, w
∗
r , such
that given a distribution of types in the marriage market, v, and the feasible
household utilities pair, (ur, up) of the young generation, each type i boy chooses
a strategy s∗i , from which nobody within the type i group finds it is in his interest
to deviate, and the strategy pair (s∗1, s
∗




jr as well as w
∗
r .
The above definition of the equilibrium in the matching stage requires that
the boys’ strategies be optimal. It implies that after observing the girls’ type
distribution, each boy maximizes his expected payoffs by choosing a particular
proposing strategy simultaneously before any match is realized. The equilibrium
is symmetric in the sense that boys of the same type are identical and choose
the same proposing strategy si, and the equilibrium strategy profile denoted by
(s∗1, s
∗
2) suggests that no one would have any incentive to deviate from his chosen
strategy. Since every boy has only one chance to make a proposal, he will not
be able to change his mind after his match outcome is realized (matching with
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either a type 1 girl, or a type 2 girl or getting rejected). After the boys propose,
the girls will commit to their posting selection rule5.
This equilibrium strategy profile is obtained under complete information. In
particular, the boys are able to observe the type distribution of the marriage
market participants and the selection rule posted by girls, and are aware of each
other’s strategy as well as the coordination frictions in the matching process.
Furthermore, they all anticipate the feasible household utilities ur and up obtai-
ned from respective feasible household income (high or low) and the household
production technology.
Recall that si ∈ [0, 1] denotes a type i boy’s likelihood of proposing to a type
1 girl. si = 1 describes the case where every type i boy chooses a pure strategy
of proposing to a type 1 girl. si = 0 describes another pure strategy of a type i
boy: proposing to a type 2 girl for sure. si ∈ (0, 1) indicates that every type i boy
chooses a mixed strategy of proposing to a type 1 girl with probability si. In an
equilibrium, boys of the same type must either choose a mixed strategy si ∈ (0, 1),
indifferent between proposing to a type 1 or a type 2 girl, when no pure strategy
can be supported as the dominant strategy, or strictly prefer proposing to one
type than the other when the corresponding pure strategy can be supported as
the dominant one. There are nine possible strategy profiles (s1, s2) since si can
take the value 1, 0, or a value in the interval (1, 0), a priori. However, under
Assumption 1, which ensures a symmetrical type distribution of boys and girls
in the marriage market, only four of them are plausible in an equilibrium. The
above analysis will be elaborated on by Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2.
Denote the ratio of up to ur by α, where up is the consumption utility gained
from a low household income and ur is the consumption utility gained from a high
household income. α is an exogenous variable and measures income disparity in
this model.
Lemma 2.1 When α is sufficiently low, type 1 boys choose a pure strategy in
equilibrium, s∗1 = 1, given any value of v and s2; otherwise, they adopt a mixed
strategy s∗1 ∈ (0, 1). s∗1 = 0 holds under any parameter region except when α = 1.
In summary,
(i)α ∈ (0, 1− 2e−1), s∗1 = 1 holds;
5Girls are committed to their posting selection rule in this model since they are assumed to
discount the payoffs from the second round matching to be zero.
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(ii)α ∈ (1− 2e−1, 1), s∗1 ∈ (0, 1) holds ;
(iii)s∗1 = 0 holds if and only if α = 1;








Proof. Let uemij denote the expected payoff of a type i boy who proposes to
a type j girl. Suppose type 1 boys choose a pure strategy to propose to type
1 girls indicated by s1 = 1, which means all the type 1 boys would propose to
type 1 girls. Then their expected payoff would be uem11 = (1 − e−1)ur. If any
of the type 1 boys deviates from this pure strategy, switching to proposing to
type 2 girls, he would be matched at probability 1, and gain a household utility
(ur + up)/2. Thus, as long as u
e
m11
= (1 − e−1)ur ≥ (ur + up)/2 which can be
reduced to α ≤ 1−2e−1, s1 = 1 can be supported as the type 1 boys’ equilibrium
strategy. Consequently, when uem11 = (1− e−1)ur ≤ (ur + up)/2, or equivalently,
α ≥ 1 − 2 · e−1, type 1 boys have an incentive to deviate from the pure strategy
and choose a mixed strategy s1 ∈ (0, 1) or the other pure strategy s1 = 0 instead.
Similarly, suppose they all choose s1 = 0, which means all the type 1 boys
would propose to a type 2 girl. Then their expected payoff would be uem12 =
1−v
2v
(1 − e− v1−v )(ur + up). If any of them deviates from this pure strategy and
proposes to a type 1 girl, he would get matched with a type 1 girl at probability





(1 − e− v1−v )(ur + up) ≥ ur,
or equivalently α ≥ 2v
(1−v)(1−e− v1−v )
− 1, s1 = 0 can be supported as the type
1 boys’ equilibrium strategy. Notice that limv→0 2v
(1−v)(1−e− v1−v )
− 1 = 1 and
limv→1 2v
(1−v)(1−e− v1−v )
− 1 = ∞, therefore only when α = 1, this inequality can
hold as the sufficient condition to support s∗1 = 0.
Based on the analysis above, when α ∈ (1− 2 · e−1, 1), s∗1 ∈ (0, 1), type 1















s∗1 is the solution to equation(2.15). It is unique over the parameter region:
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This lemma states some important properties of the type 1 boys’ strategy in
an equilibrium of the marriage market. First, when the type 1 boys choose a
strategy, either a pure or a mixed one, they do not need to take type 2 boys’
response into consideration. The value of s1 solely depends on the parameters α
and v. This is because the girls’ selection rule favors type 1 applicants over type
2 applicants.
Second, the way s1 varies in α shows that the inequality of household utility at
the end of the matching stage plays a major role in type 1 boys’ decision process.
When they foresee huge inequality in future, the benefit from being matched
with a type 1 girl outweighs the disutility arising from the risk of matching
failure. Every type 1 boy will choose a pure strategy of proposing to a type
1 girl for sure. Conversely, when the inequality is not that sharp, type 1 boys will
maximize their expected payoffs by choosing a mixed strategy to find a balance
between matching quality and matching probability. The strategy s∗1 adopted by
type 1 boys can also be interpreted as the equilibrium fraction of type 1 boys
who propose to type 1 girls when considering the population of type 1 boys as a
whole.
In addition, since the risk of being left unmatched has an upper bound under
this assumed symmetrical type distribution, unless there is foreseeable perfect
equality (α = 1), none of the type 1 boys would give up proposing to a type 1
girl at all.
Furthermore, in the mixed strategy case, the likelihood of proposing to a type
1 girl is strictly increasing in the fraction of type 1 participants in the marriage
market, which indicates that for type 1 boys, more type 1 girls imply a better
chance to be matched with them even though the number of type 1 boys increases
to the same extent.
Compared with type 1 boys, type 2 boys are in an inferior position under the
girls’ selection rule. Their optimal proposing strategy as the best response to type
1 boys’ strategy also depends on α and v. The extra dependence on s∗1 makes type
2 boys’ decision making process different from that of type 1 boys. For example,
suppose in the case where type 1 boys choose a pure strategy of proposing to
type 1 girls, s∗1 = 1, if type 2 boys choose a pure strategy of proposing to type 1
girls too, the expected payoff for them is, uem21 = P21(ur + up)/2. Substitute the





ve−1(1− e− 1−vv )(ur + up) (2.16)
If any boy of type 2 deviates from this pure strategy, switching to type 2 girls,
his matching probability would be 1, which means he would get a payoff up for




−1(1− e− 1−vv )(ur + up) ≥ up
The above inequality means that every type 2 boy finds that staying with a
pure strategy of proposing to a type 1 girl is at least as good as switching to type
2 girls, thus it is not in his interest to deviate from this pure strategy. Define the
critical value va as the solution to the equation below:
v
2(1− v)e
−1(1− e− 1−vv )(ur + up) = up
v
(1− v)e
−1(1− e− 1−vv ) = 2α
1 + α
(2.17)
Given the value of α, if v ∈ (0, va), the inequality discussed above does not
hold, which means that type 2 boys have an incentive to deviate from the pure
strategy s2 = 1. Conversely, if v ∈ [va, 1), the inequality holds and the pure
strategy s2 = 1 is supported in the equilibrium. The following lemma provides a
complete characterization of type 2 boys’ strategy in the equilibrium.
Lemma 2.2 : Type 2 boys’ strategy in equilibrium is characterized by the follo-
wing separate cases:
(i)In the case where type 1 boys choose a pure strategy of proposing to type 1
girls in the equilibrium (s∗1 = 1), type 2 boys choose a pure strategy in equilibrium,
s∗2 = 1, iff α is as low as α ∈ (0, (2e− 1)−1), and v is as high as v ∈ [va, 1). Type
2 boys choose a mixed strategy, s∗2 ∈ (0, 1), if α ∈ [(2e− 1)−1, 1− 2e−1] and







v ) = α
1− es2−1
1− s2 (2.18)








(ii)In the case where type 1 boys choose a mixed strategy in equilibrium (s∗1 ∈
(0, 1)), type 2 boys choose a mixed strategy in equilibrium, s∗2 ∈ (0, 1), when α and












where s∗1 is the solution to equation (2.15).












2 = 0 holds if and only if α = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 indicate that an equilibrium in the marriage mar-
ket is one of the following four types:
• s∗1 = s∗2 = 1, both type 1 and type 2 boys choose a pure strategy of proposing
to type 1 girls only, as they can earn a higher expected payoff than if
proposing to type 2 girls with any positive probability;
• s∗1 = 1, s∗2 ∈ (0, 1), type 1 boys stick to the pure strategy of proposing to
type 1 girls, while type 2 boys choose a mixed strategy by proposing to
type 1 and type 2 girls with some positive probability respectively, being
indifferent between proposing to the two types of girls;
• 0 < s∗2 < s∗1 < 1, type 1 and type 2 boys choose a mixed strategy respecti-
vely, being indifferent between proposing to type 1 and type 2 girls.
• s∗1 = s∗2 = 0, both type 1 and type 2 boys choose a pure strategy of proposing
to type 2 girls only. This type of equilibrium would occur if and only if
α = 1.
The four types of equilibria shown above never occur under the same parameter
region, given Assumption 1 is satisfied.
Intuitively, we can see that the case where s2 > s1 would never happen in an
equilibrium. This is because type 1 boys are favored by type 1 girls under the
selection rule. In addition, type 1 girls are regarded as the better potential mates
by all the boys. Thus type 2 boys always have a worse chance of getting matched
with type 1 girls, which consequently lowers their likelihood of proposing to type
1 girls in an equilibrium.
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Furthermore, there are some other possible types of strategy profiles not occur-
ring in the equilibrium under any parameter region. One of them is s1 = 1, s2 = 0,
where all the type 1 boys propose to a type 1 girl and all the type 2 boys propose
to a type 2 girl. By contrast, 0 < s∗2 < s
∗
1 < 1 is one of the possible types that
occurs in the equilibrium. That is because the distribution is symmetrical across
gender under Assumption 1 and the household production technology is neutral
(which will be defined formally and elaborated on later). Consequently, due to
the ratio of type 1 boys to type 1 girls (which is equal to 1), no girl can be gua-
ranteed of receiving at least one proposal from a type 1 boy under the directed
matching mechanism even in the scenario where every type 1 boy proposes to a
type 1 girl for sure. Hence, there is always some chance of getting matched with
type 1 girls for a type 2 boy if he proposes to her due to the coordination frictions
among type 1 boys. Given the neutral household production technology, type 1
girls are attractive enough to type 2 boys as long as there is a positive chance of
getting matched with them. Similarly, in the case where type 1 boys choose a
mixed strategy of proposing to each type of girl with some positive probability,
type 2 boys would not give up proposing to type 1 girls either as they might be
even luckier in getting matched with a type 1 girl who is “ignored” by type 1
boys due to both coordination frictions and an insufficient number of proposals
from type 1 boys.
In an equilibrium of the marriage market, the strategy profile (s∗1, s
∗
2) pins
down the value of first round matching probabilities P ∗ij, P̃
∗
ji, as well as the second
round matching probabilities P sei∗, P̃ sej∗. Though the outcome of the second
round matching does not affect participants’ decisions in the first round, it does
affect the probabilities of forming a rich or a poor household at the end of the
matching stage for each type of participant, which are calculated as follows:











(1− P ∗se1)[(1− P ∗11)s∗1 + (1− P ∗12)(1− s∗1)] (2.20)
P ∗1r is defined as the overall probability of a type 1 boy forming a rich household
at the end of the matching stage. P ∗11s
∗
1 indicates the probability of a type 1
boy getting matched with a type 1 girl at the end of the first round matching;
1
2
P ∗12(1 − s∗1) indicates the probability of a type 1 boy getting matched with a
type 2 girl and forming a rich household at the end of the first round matching;
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P ∗se1[(1 − P ∗11)s∗1 + (1 − P ∗12)(1 − s∗1)] represents the probability of a type 1 boy
who has been left unmatched after the first round, getting matched with a type
1 girl in the second round, and forming a rich household at the end of the second
round of matching; 1
2
(1 − P ∗se1)[(1 − P ∗11)s∗1 + (1 − P ∗12)(1 − s∗1)] represents the
probability of a type 1 boy who has been left unmatched after the first round,
but getting matched with a type 2 girl in the second round, and forming a rich









P ∗se1[(1 − P ∗21)s∗2 + (1 − P ∗22)(1 − s∗2)] (2.21)
P ∗2r is defined as the overall probability of a type 2 boy forming a rich household




2 indicates the probability of a type 2 boy
getting matched with a type 1 girl and forming a rich household at the end of
the first round matching; 1
2
P ∗se1[(1− P ∗21) · s∗2 + (1− P ∗22)(1− s∗2)] represents the
probability of a type 2 boy who has been left unmatched after the first round,
getting matched with a type 1 girl in the second round, and forming a rich
household at the end of the matching stage.





P̃ ∗12 + P̃
∗se1 · (1 − P̃ ∗11 − P̃ ∗12) +
1
2
· (1 − P̃ ∗se1)(1 − P̃ ∗12 − P̃ ∗12)
(2.22)
P̃ ∗1r is defined as the overall probability of a type 1 girl forming a rich household
at the end of the matching stage. P̃ ∗11 indicates the probability of a type 1 girl
getting matched with a type 1 boy, and forming a rich household at the end of
the first round matching; 1
2
P̃ ∗12 indicates the probability of a type 1 girl getting
matched with a type 2 boy in the first round and forming a rich household at the
end of the first round matching; P̃ ∗se1 ·(1−P̃ ∗11−P̃ ∗12) represents the probability of
a type 1 girl who has been left unmatched after the first round, getting matched
with a type 1 boy and forming a rich household at the end of the second round
matching; 1
2
· (1 − P̃ ∗se1)(1 − P̃ ∗12 − P̃ ∗12) represents the probability of a type 1
girl who has been left unmatched after the first round matching, getting matched
with a type 2 boy in the second round and forming a rich household at the end




· P̃ ∗21 +
1
2
· P̃ ∗se1 · (1− P̃ ∗21 − P̃ ∗22) (2.23)
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P̃ ∗2r is defined as the overall probability of a type 2 girl forming a rich household
at the end of the matching stage. 1
2
· P̃ ∗21 indicates the probability of a type 2 girl
getting matched with a type 1 boy and forming a rich household at the end of
the second round matching; 1
2
· P̃ ∗se1 · (1− P̃ ∗21− P̃ ∗22) represents the probability of
a type 2 girl who has been left unmatched after the first round matching, getting
matched with a type 1 boy in the second round matching and forming a rich
household at the end of the matching stage.
These expressions from (2.20) to (2.23) are based on the assumption that the
marriage market is cleared at the end of the matching stage and the household
production technology is neutral. The matching process allows for four routes
for young people to form a household: a type 1 boy and a type 1 girl forming a
rich household with probability 1, a type 2 boy and a type 1 girl, or alternatively
a type 2 boy and a type 1 girl, forming a rich household with probability 1
2
, a
poor household with probability 1
2
; a type 2 boy and a type 2 girl forming a
poor household with probability 1. We derive some properties on the household
formation process according to the set-up of the model:
Property 1 Under Assumption 1 and the household production technology, the
probability of forming a rich household is the same to the same type individuals







thermore, the equilibrium income distribution, characterized by the fraction of
rich households at the end of the matching stage, equals the fraction of skilled
individuals in the marriage market, which is indicated by w∗r = v.
Property 1, together with Property 2 (which will be presented in the next
subsection), is illustrated by Figure A.1 to Figure A.4 in Appendix A3. Besides no
gender difference with regard to the probability of becoming rich, Property 1 also
suggests that the household production technology make the matching process,
so called, neutral, in the sense that it does not change the overall contribution of
educational investment to the economy as a whole. In other words, the outcome
of ‘who marries whom’ does not increase or decrease the total match surplus
compared with that under an alternative assignment rule. Thus, the productivity
of education sector, which determines the aggregate human capital capacity of
the economy, would not been affected by the matching mechanism. However, the
matching outcomes will be taken into consideration by each parental household in
the investment stage, which would affect their educational investment incentives
from an individual household’s perspective and thus the value of v. In that sense,
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the matching process impacts on the economy through the endogenized v as the
measure of the fraction of skilled individuals in the economy.
2.4 The Investment Stage
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, parental households are divided into
two types, with a high household income recognized as the rich and a low hou-
sehold income recognized as the poor. In both parental households, parents are
altruistic towards their children in the sense that their own utility contain their
children’s (which is illustrated by (2.24) and (2.25)). Compared to their children,
parents are assumed to be more sophisticated about marriage in the sense that
they are able to foresee the full picture of marriage market outcome from the
first round to the second round matching (they are fully rational). Their children
are partially rational in that they discount second round matching heavily due
to psychological disutility from matching failure in the first round.
Based on this forward looking behavior, parents sense that the high edu-
cational investment would make their children more attractive and give them
advantage in the marriage market. However, assortative matching can not be
guaranteed due to coordination frictions and the ‘speculative behavior’ of the
less attractive competitors with the low education attainment (type 2) in the
first round matching. In addition, the randomness in the second round weakens
parental households’ control of their children’s matching outcome. On the other
hand, putting their children at an inferior position in the marriage market by
making the low educational investment does not mean their children will defi-
nitely end up with a poor household. Their less attractive children still have a
chance of matching with skilled individuals, and form a rich household with some
positive probability. Though the chance is worse than if making the high educa-
tional investment, the less costly educational investment would increase parental
households’ own consumption as compensation.
2.4.1 Investment Strategy Profile
We still focus on the symmetric equilibrium at the investment stage. Parental
households of the same type choose an identical investment strategy, either a
pure or a mixed one. We denote the endogenous parental households’ investment
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strategy profile by two (1× 2) row vectors:
Kr = [ kr, (1− kr) ], Kp = [ kp, (1− kp) ]
where kr and kp are the probabilities at which the high educational investment
at cost c1 is chosen by rich and poor households respectively. Hence, 1− kr and
1 − kp are the probabilities at which the low educational investment at the cost
c2 is chosen by rich households and poor households respectively. Investment
strategy profile is represented by Kr or Kp, which is a unit vector if this is a pure
strategy.
Secondly, we define the exogenous households’ utilities from consumption by











where uc1r denotes the consumption utility of rich households gained from their
household income deducting the cost of the high educational investment c1, and
uc2r is the consumption utility of rich households gained from their household in-
come deducting the cost of the low educational investment c2; similarly, u
c1
p and
uc2p are the consumption utilities gained by the poor households out of their net
income (total household income deducting educational investment cost) respecti-
vely.
Lastly, we define the endogenous expected offspring household utility by a








P1rur + (1− P1r)up
P2rur + (1− P2r)up
]
where ue1 = P1rur + (1 − P1r)up is the expected utility of a type 1 individual in
the matching stage, and correspondingly, ue2 = P2rur+(1−P2r)up is the expected
utility of a type 2 individual in the matching stage. Based on Property 1 in the
previous subsection, boys’ probability of forming a rich household equals that
of girls. Hence, here we only calculate the boys’ probability of forming a rich
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household.
Based on the above definitions, the parental households’ utilities can be re-
presented by Ur and Up for the rich and the poor household respectively, which
are defined as follows:
Ur = KrU
c
r + β ·KrUo (2.24)
Up = KpU
c
p + β ·KpUo (2.25)
From the expressions shown above, we can see that parents’ utilities consist of
two parts: their own consumption utilities and their children’s utilities. β is the





the expected consumption utilities of parental households.
Kr and Kp affect the parents’ expected utility through two channels, directly
through children’s utilities indicated by KrU
o and KpU
o, and indirectly through
children’s skill distribution indicated by v. Let winr be the exogenous parental
households’ income distribution parameter, which denotes the fraction of rich
parental households in the parental generation. The underlying rationale of the
indirect effect on parents’ expected utility by their investment strategies is that
the strategic variables, kr of Kr and kp of Kp, together with w
in
r determine the
value of v. The offspring’s pre-match skill distribution indicator, v, is crucial to
the equilibrium proposing strategies s∗1 and s
∗
2. Consequently v has an effect on
the probability of forming a rich household at the end of the matching stage, P ∗1r
and P ∗2r.
By fully anticipating the matching mechanism in the marriage market and
household production technology, parents are confronted with the trade-off bet-
ween a higher consumption utility of their own and a better future for their
children. Investment choices available in the investment stage involve strategic
thinking by parental households. Their joint investment decisions determine the
fraction of skilled individuals in the next generation. Hence, in the investment
stage, parental households endogenize v by making the optimal educational in-
vestment strategies. Moreover, the following property elaborates on the effects of
v on the household formation:
Property 2: For any given value of α ∈ (0, 1) anticipated by the marriage mar-




1r/∂v > 0, ∂P
∗
2r/∂v > 0, and
∂(P ∗1r − P ∗2r)/∂v < 0.
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This property says that both type 1 and type 2 individuals’ probabilities of
forming a rich household at the end of the matching stage strictly increase in the
fraction of skilled individuals v in the marriage market, but the difference between
the two probabilities strictly decreases in v. This property is very important as
it reveals the monotonicity of the marginal benefits of being a type 1 (skilled)
individual as a function of v, which is the key basis for the uniqueness of the
equilibrium in the investment stage.
Both kr and kp can be equal to 1, 0, or any number within the interval (0, 1).
The following lemma characterizes the investment strategy profile which would
be adopted by parental households in an equilibrium under different parameter
regions.
Lemma 2.3 There are six types of investment strategy profiles in the equilibrium
at the investment stage:
(i) when uc2r − uc1r ≥ β(ur − up), both the rich households and the poor hou-
seholds would choose a dominant pure strategy, kr = kp = 0, making the low
educational investment on behalf of their children;
(ii) when 1
2
β(ur−up) ≤ uc2r −uc1r < β(ur−up) ≤ uc2p −uc1p , the rich households’
strategy may be a mixed one, kr ∈ (0, 1), or a pure one, kr = 0 or kr = 1, which
depends on the fraction of rich parental households winr . The poor households
always choose a dominant pure strategy, kp = 0;
(iii) when uc2r −uc1r ≤ 12β(ur−up) < uc2p −uc1p ≤ β(ur−up), the poor households’
strategy may be a mixed one, kp ∈ (0, 1), or a pure one, kp = 0, kp = 1, which
depends on winr . The rich households always choose a dominant pure strategy,
kr = 1;
(iv) when uc2r − uc1r < uc2p − uc1p ≤ 12β(ur − up), both types of households would
choose a dominant pure strategy, kr = kp = 1;
(v) when uc2r − uc1r ≤ 12β(ur − up), and uc2p − uc1p ≥ β(ur − up), the rich hou-
seholds always choose a dominant pure strategy kr = 1 and the poor households




β(ur−up) < uc2r −uc1r < uc2p −uc1p < β(ur−up), both the rich house-
holds and the poor households may choose a mixed strategy, kr ∈ (0, 1), kp ∈ (0, 1),
or a pure one, which depends on winr .
Proof. see Appendix A.2.
Intuitively, this lemma says that when the consumption utility loss (that is
caused by a higher cost of the high educational investment) is too high to be com-
pensated by the corresponding utility gain of their offspring, all the households
would choose low educational investment. Conversely, if the utility loss is lower
than the corresponding utility gain of their offspring, all the households would
choose high educational investment. However, the more parental households that
make the high educational investment, the larger the fraction of skilled individuals
in the matching stage, and the smaller the gap of the expected utilities between
being skilled and unskilled, which in return would weaken parental households’
incentives to choose high educational investment.
Notice that the rich households can always suffer less than the poor house-
holds from costly high educational investment. uc2r − uc1r < uc2p − uc1p represents
this feature. The underlying rationale is the concavity of the utility function.
Consequently, the rich households are able to tolerate larger v than the poor
households before stopping producing type 1 offspring and switching to produ-
cing type 2 offspring. Specifically, we define vp and vr as the critical values of
the fraction of skilled offspring for the rich and the poor parental households
respectively, at which their consumption utility loss equals the amount of utility
increase from producing type 1 offspring other than type 2 offspring. Based on
the analysis shown above, we get vp < vr.
Definition 1 The critical value of v, the fraction of skilled persons in the next
generation, for the poor households, is defined as vp where vp satisfies the following
equation:
uc2p − uc1p = P ∗1r|v=vpur + (1− P ∗1r|v=vp)up − (P ∗2r|v=vpur + (1− P ∗2r|v=vp)up)
= (P ∗1r|v=vp − P ∗2r|v=vp)(ur − up)
(2.26)
Similarly, the critical value for the rich households is defined as vr, where vr
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satisfies the following equation:
uc2r − uc1r = P ∗1r|v=vrur + (1− P ∗1r|v=vr)up − (P ∗2r|v=vrur + (1− P ∗2r|v=vr)up)
= (P ∗1r|v=vr − P ∗2r|v=vr)(ur − up)
(2.27)
The six types of investment strategy profiles are illustrated by Figure A.1 in
Appendix. In Figure A.1, vp and vr are the X coordinates of the intersection
points of the curve (representing the premium of high educational investment)
and the horizontal lines (representing the consumption utility loss by costly high
educational investment for the rich and the poor parental households respecti-
vely).
2.4.2 Equilibrium Outcome
Based on the characteristics of the investment strategy profiles stated in Lemma
2.3 and the two properties of the household formation, we are able to focus on
the most interesting case, type (vi) investment strategy profile. By considering
an additional exogenous variable, winr (the fraction of rich parental households),
we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1 A symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium at the investment stage
consisting of parental household investment strategy profile (K∗r , K
∗
p), expected
household utility (U∗r , U
∗
p ) and corresponding v
∗ exists and is unique, given the
parameter region where 1
2
β(ur − up) < uc2r − uc1r < uc2p − uc1p < β(ur − up) and the
initial income distribution parameter, winr ∈ (0, 1). Moreover,
(i) when 0 < winr ≤ vp, the equilibrium investment strategies are, k∗r = 1, k∗p =
vp−winr
1−winr , and the equilibrium fraction of skilled offspring is, v
∗ = vp;
(ii) when vp ≤ winr ≤ vr, the equilibrium investment strategies are, k∗r =
1, k∗p = 0, and the equilibrium fraction of skilled offspring is, v
∗ = winr ;
(iii) when vr ≤ winr < 1, the equilibrium investment strategies are, k∗r =
vr
winr
, k∗p = 0, and the equilibrium fraction of skilled offspring is, v
∗ = vr.
Proof. In the parameter region 1
2
β(ur−up) < uc2r −uc1r < uc2p −uc1p < β(ur−up),
both the rich and the poor parental households may adopt a mixed or a pure
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strategy as stated in Lemma 2.3. Since the marginal benefit of producing skilled
offspring is continuous and monotonically decreasing in v, the uniqueness and
existence of the equilibrium is guaranteed. Whether the parental households
choose a mixed or a pure investment strategy depends on the initial income dis-
tribution parameter, winr . Consequently, the final skill distribution, v
∗, is also
determined by winr . A detailed explanation is made in the following analysis.



















Figure 2.1: The premium of high educational investment and the loss of consump-
tion utility by parental households against the fraction of the skilled
offspring
of high educational investment. In Figure 2.1, the downward sloping curve repre-
sents the high educational investment premium, R = (P ∗1r − P ∗2r)(ur − up) as a
function of v. Two parallel horizontal lines represent the consumption utility loss
from costly high educational investment for the poor and the rich parental hou-
sehold respectively. The two lines intersect with the high educational investment
premium curve at two points, (vp, u
c2
p − uc1p ) and (vr, uc2r − uc1r ) respectively.
The economic rationale of parental households can be inferred from this figure.
We can see that both the rich households and the poor households prefer the high
educational investment before v reaches vp, as the premium of high educational
investment exceeds the consumption utility loss from the associated higher cost
(c1 > c2). In the region where v lies between vp and vr, the poor prefer the
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low investment while the rich prefer the high investment because the premium
of high educational investment is high enough to compensate the consumption
utility loss of the rich, but is not high enough for the poor. As v surpasses vr,
both the rich and the poor prefer low investment, because the premium of the
high investment is lower than consumption utility loss of both the rich and the
poor parental households.
Besides the comparison between the gains and losses of consumption utility,
the fraction of rich parental households, winr , also affects the equilibrium out-
comes.
Consider the case where winr takes an arbitrary value w1, and 0 < w1 < vp
6as
shown in Figure 2.1. When all the rich parental households choose the high
educational investment, the corresponding v equals w1, which is still smaller than
vp. Hence, the poor parental households choose a mixed strategy kp ∈ (0, 1),
which leads to a result where a fraction kp of the poor households choose high
investment, and a fraction 1− kp of the poor households choose low investment.
The optimal value of kp would make the poor just be indifferent between the two
investment choices. It implies that the number of the poor parental household
making the high investment just fills the gap between w1N and vpN so that
the total number of skilled individuals produced is as large as vpN . Therefore,




r = 1 and the
equilibrium fraction of skilled offspring, v∗ = vp.
Consider another case where winr takes an arbitrary value w2, and vp < w2 < vr
as shown in Figure 2.1. It is obvious to see that all the rich households choose
high investment, and produce vN type 1 offspring, where v = w2. On the other
hand, all the poor choose low investment as the number of the skilled offspring
produced by the rich households is too large to induce any extra poor households
to make the high educational investment. Therefore, we obtain the equilibrium
investment strategies k∗p = 0, k
∗
r = 1 and the equilibrium fraction of skilled
offspring, v∗ = winr .
6In addition, when winr = vp the poor parental households are just indifferent between the
two investment choices and they would invest low as all the rich parental households would
make the high investment, k∗p = 0, k∗r = 1. This result can also be obtained by substituting




1−winr . On the
other hand, when winr = vr, the rich parental households are just indifferent between the two
investment choices if all of them make the high investment and they would do so, k∗p = 0,
k∗r = 1. This result can also be obtained by substituting w
in
r = vr into the expression of kr in
case (iii) where k∗r =
vr
winr
. Hence, the equality sign can be taken in all the three cases.
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Consider the last case where winr takes an arbitrary value w3, and vr < w3 <
1. All the poor households would choose the low investment as the number
of the rich households is so large. The rich households would choose a mixed
strategy kr ∈ (0, 1), which leads to a situation where a fraction kr of the rich
households choose high investment, and a fraction 1 − kr of the rich households
choose low investment. The optimal value of kr would make the poor indifferent
between the two investment choices. It implies that the number of rich parental
households making the high investment is just equal to vr. Therefore, we obtain
the equilibrium investment strategies k∗r =
vr
winr
, k∗p = 0 and the equilibrium
fraction of skilled offspring, v∗ = vr.
The relationship between the initial wealth distribution of parental households










Figure 2.2: The equilibrium fraction of skilled offspring against the fraction of
rich parental households
This figure summarizes the analysis shown above. The horizontal axis repre-
sents the initial income distribution parameter, winr , and the vertical axis repre-
sents the fraction of skilled offspring in the equilibrium, v∗. The first line segment
in red located in the left lower corner represents the case where winr ∈ (0, vp], and
the corresponding equilibrium skill distribution indicator v∗ equals the critical
value of the poor parental household vp; the middle line segment in blue overlap-
ping the 45◦ line, represents the case where winr ∈ [vp, vr], and the corresponding
equilibrium skill distribution indicator v∗ equals the initial income distribution
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parameter winr ; the upper right line segment in green represents the case where
winr ∈ [vr, 1], and v∗ equals the critical value of the rich parental household vr.
The corresponding relationship between the initial income distribution para-
meter, winr and the equilibrium investment strategy of the parental households,




















Figure 2.3: Equilibrium investment strategies against the fraction of rich parental
households
In this figure, the horizontal axis represents both the initial household in-
come distribution parameter winr and offspring skill distribution indicator v (v
also equals the fraction of parental households who choose high educational in-
vestment). The vertical axis represents the equilibrium parental households’ in-
vestment strategies, k∗r and k
∗
p, which are the probabilities at which parental
households choose high educational investment. The upper curve in blue repre-
sents the rich parental households’ equilibrium investment strategy, k∗r . It equals
1 when an arbitrary winr is smaller than the rich parental households’ critical
value vr, which indicates that the rich would choose a pure investment strategy
of making the high educational investment. It starts to decrease in winr after w
in
r
exceeds vr and equals
vr
winr
, which indicates the rich would choose a mixed strategy,
so a fraction vr
winr
of the rich parental households would choose the high educa-
tional investment. The lower curve in red represents poor parental households’







vp, which indicates that a fraction
vp−winr
1−winr of the poor parental households would
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choose the high educational investment. It equals zero after winr exceeds vp, indi-
cating that the poor would choose a pure strategy of making the low educational
investment.
As stated in Property 1, the fraction of offspring households that are rich, wr,
equals the fraction of offspring who are skilled, v. Hence, we have w∗r = v
∗ in
equilibrium. It is interesting to compare the income distribution of parental hou-
sehold with that of offspring’s households. Considering the parental households
income distribution has an effect on that of the offspring as stated in Proposition
2.1, the comparison between the two can be generalized by the following corollary:
Corollary 2.1 When winr < vp, an increase in the number of rich households in
the offspring’s generation occurs; when winr > vr, a decrease in the number of rich
households in the offspring’s generation occurs; when winr lies between vp and vr,
the number of rich households does not change in the offspring’s generation.
The possible increase in the fraction of rich households of the children’s gene-
ration as stated in Corollary 2.1 exists because when the fraction of rich parental
households is very small, not only do all the rich make the high educational in-
vestment, but some of the poor households also do so. On the other hand, the
possible decrease in the fraction of rich households exists because when winr is
very large, some of the rich households and all the poor households choose low
investment. Finally, it is possible that the household income distribution becomes
stationary across the two generations, with the rich choosing high investment and
the poor choosing low investment.
Proposition 2.1 only considers one of the six investment profiles according
to separate parameter regions listed in Lemma 2.3. The other five types of in-
vestment profiles lead to similar but different equilibrium outcomes, which is
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2 The equilibrium outcomes are presented in the following five
cases that correspond to type (i), type (ii), type (iii), type (iv) and type (v) in-
vestment profiles under separate parameter regions as stated in Lemma 2.3:
(i) In the parameter region where uc2r − uc1r ≥ β(ur − up), k∗r = k∗p = 0,
v∗ = w∗r = 0.
(ii) In the parameter region where 1
2
β(ur − up) ≤ uc2r − uc1r < β(ur − up) ≤
uc2p − uc1p , k∗p = 0, k∗r = 1 and v∗ = w∗r = vp if 0 < winr ≤ vr; k∗p = 0, k∗r = vrwinr and
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v∗ = w∗r = vr if vr ≤ winr < 1.
(iii) In the parameter region where uc2r − uc1r ≤ 12β(ur − up) < uc2p − uc1p ≤




and v∗ = w∗r = vp if 0 < w
in
r ≤ vp.
(iv) In the parameter region where uc2r − uc1r < uc2p − uc1p ≤ 12β(ur − up),
k∗r = k
∗
p = 1, v
∗ = w∗r = 1.
(v) when uc2r − uc1r ≤ 12β(ur − up), and uc2p −uc1p ≥ β(ur − up), k∗r = 1 , k∗p = 0
and v∗ = w∗r = w
in
r , given any value of w
in
r .
Proof. Refer to the proof of Lemma 2.3 and Proposition 2.1.
Figure A.1 illustrates all types of investment profiles and provides some intui-
tion in interpreting this proposition. Case (i) in Proposition 2.2 that corresponds
to the type (i) investment profile indicates that the premium from the high educa-
tional investment is so low that no one would choose high investment, and all the
offspring’s households would be poor. In case(ii), the premium is sufficient low
that all the poor parental households choose low investment, while it is possibly
high enough for the rich to choose high investment and the investment strategy
adopted by rich parental households determines the income distribution. In case
(iii), the premium is sufficient high that all the rich parental households choose
high investment, while it is possibly not high enough for the poor to choose high
investment and it is the poor parental households’ investment strategy that de-
termines the income distribution. Case (iv) refers to the situation where the
premium is so high that every parental household would choose high investment,
and all the offspring’s households would be rich. Case (v) represents the scenario
where education cost structure perfectly separates the skill prospect of the off-
spring from the rich parental household and that of the poor parental household,
and the fraction of rich households would not change across the two generations.
2.5 Comparative Statics
Based on the analysis shown above, this section analyzes the effects of an exoge-
nous change in parameters of feasible household income inequality and education
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costs on the equilibrium outcomes. First, changes in the ratio of rich households’
utility to poor households’ utility, α, are analyzed in the following context.
The overall effect of α on equilibrium outcomes is through returns to educa-
tional investment, which can be decomposed into two parts: a direct effect on
the difference in the offspring’s household utilities stemming from the inequa-
lity in feasible household income ur − up = up( 1α − 1) and an indirect effect on
the difference in the skilled versus unskilled offspring’s chance of forming a rich
household: P1r − P2r.
Proposition 2.3 Both ur − up and ∂(P1r − P2r)/∂v are decreasing in α.
This proposition can be verified intuitively. By the definition of α, the diffe-
rence in utility of a rich household and that of a poor household (both consume
up all the household income) shrinks. It also implies a less attractive household
income prospect of getting matched with a type 1 (skilled) individual. By anti-
cipating this change, type 1 boys and type 2 boys put more weight on matching
probability in the first round matching when they are confronted with the trade-
off between matching probability and matching quality. This result can also be
inferred from Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2, which state that s∗1 generally decreases
in α, and s∗2 decreases in α too, but at a lower speed
7. Hence, the chance of
forming a rich household for a skilled individual, P ∗1r, decreases as α increases,
as does the chance of forming a rich household for an unskilled individual, P ∗2r.
However, P ∗2r decreases in α at a lower speed than P
∗
1r, which leads to the result
that the gap between the two probabilities is shrinking.
Based on Proposition 2.3, we can further infer the effect of α on the changes
of the premium of high educational investment by the following Corollary:
Corollary 2.2 An increase in α decreases the premium of high educational in-
vestment β(P1r−P2r)(ur−up) under any value of the skilled fraction of offspring,
v, and this increase also decreases the speed at which the premium decreases in v.
Figure A.6 in Appendix illustrates the premium of high educational invest-
ment under different values of α. As it is shown in the figure, the premium curve
shifts downwards as α increases and it also becomes flatter at a higher value of
α.
7Recall that in Lemma 2.1, s∗1 = 1 when α is low enough, and otherwise s∗1 ∈ (0, 1) and is




2 ∈ (0, 1). It can
be inferred that s∗2 decreases in α at a lower speed than s
∗




Based on the results given above, we then look at the possible changes of
equilibrium outcomes according to the changes in α across parameter regions,
under which different types of investment profiles are considered (refer to Figure
A.1 in the Appendix to get the intuition). It can be summarized as follows:
Remark 2.1 An increase in α discourages parental households from choosing
the high educational investment as it decreases the critical values, v∗p, or v
∗
r , or
both the two values, if the original investment profile belongs to type (ii), (iii), or
(vi). In type (i) investment profile, only an increase in α would affect equilibrium
outcomes. In type (iv) and type (v) investment profiles, only a sufficiently large
increase in α would decrease the value of v∗p, or v
∗
r , or both.
Moreover, a stationary income distribution is more likely to happen due to an
increase in α as the particular interval (vp, vr), within which lies w
in
r that would
lead to a stationary fraction of rich households in the next generation, would be
enlarged due to a larger distance between vr and vp when the investment profile
belongs to type (ii),(iii) or (vi). If this increase is sufficient, this effect also applies
to type (iv) and type (v) investment profiles.
Next, let’s look at the effect of the costs in education on equilibrium out-
comes. We are more interested in the difference in costs between the high and
the low educational investment, hence, for simplicity, we hold the cost of the low
educational investment as a constant, e.g. c2 = 0. By doing this, any change in
the cost difference would be represented by a value of the high educational invest-
ment cost alone. The education cost variation leads to a change in the relative
suffering from the utility loss of consumption by the parental households.
An increase in the cost of the high educational investment, c1, would cause an
increase of utility loss of consumption from the high educational investment by
the two types of parental households, uc2p −uc1p for the rich, uc2r −uc1r for the poor.
It also increases the distance between the two utility losses, (uc2p −uc1p )−(uc2r −uc1r ).
Take the type (vi) investment profile as an example, this effect can be represented
by a leftwards shifting of vp and vr where vp would shift more than vr, and an
increasing distance between the two points will be observed. As the cost of
high educational investment increases, an exogenous winr , which would lead to an
increase in v∗ in the next generation under the original education cost structure
(the case where winr < vp), is very likely to result in an unchanged v
∗ instead.
This is because winr is possibly between the new vp and the new vr. On the other
hand, if this exogenous winr leads to an unchanged v
∗ under the original education
40
cost structure (the case where vp < w
in
r < vr), it is possible to cause a decrease
in v∗ under the new education cost structure instead.
Generally speaking, a larger difference between the cost of the high educatio-
nal investment and that of the low one leads to a larger difference in the suffering
from consumption utility loss of the rich and the poor parental households. The
increase in inequality of education costs may lead to a larger difference between
the chance of forming a rich household of a skilled individual and that of an
unskilled individual, for it may reduce the fraction of skilled offspring by discou-
raging the parental households, especially those with a low income, from making
the high educational investment. When the difference in suffering from consump-
tion utility loss of the rich and of the poor is large enough, education system just
perfectly separates the educational investment behavior of the rich and that of
the poor (which is illustrated by the type (v) investment profile), even though it
seems that both types of households can ‘afford to pay’ these costs. In that case,
stationary income distribution occurs no matter what the income distribution in
the parental generation is.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
According to the static model described above, we characterize the equilibrium
consisting of the parental households’ investment strategies and the corresponding
matching outcomes of their children, which also generate the fraction of rich
households in the offspring’s generation. By focusing on the most interesting
case, under the parameter region of type (vi) investment profile, we are able
to re-examine the competitive feature of the family formation process through
educational investment and the marriage market, which affects the household
income distribution of the younger generation. The results can be summarized
as follows:
• An increase in the number of rich households in the young generation occurs
in the case where the initial fraction of the rich households is relatively small
and the inequality of the feasible household income is large enough, so that
the poor find the competition from the rich is not too intense while the
reward of high educational investment is attractive, which encourages the
poor to make the high educational investment.
• A decrease in the number of rich households in the young generation occurs
in the case where the initial fraction of the rich households is relatively large
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and the inequality of feasible household income is not large enough, so that
the competition within the rich as well as between the rich and the poor
is too intense while the reward of high educational investment turns out to
be relatively less attractive, which discourages both the poor and the rich
from making the high educational investment.
• A stationary fraction of the rich households across the two generations
occurs in the case where the initial fraction of rich households is just in-
between the ‘relatively’ small and the ‘relatively’ large, together with in-
equality of the feasible household income prospects, which generates a level
of competition between the rich and the poor that ensures all of the rich
choose high investment, crowding out the poor, who all choose low invest-
ment.
In each case discussed above, the probability that the offspring from a rich
household forming a poor household (the downward income mobility rate) and
the probability that the offspring from a poor household forming a rich household
(considered as the upward income mobility rate) are both positive, even when the
income distribution across the two generations is stationary as mentioned in the
third case shown above.
By introducing matching frictions, this model implies that assortative mating
itself alone does not contribute to intergenerational income stratification. On the
contrary, take type (iv) investment profile as an example, all the parental house-
holds would choose the high educational investment if there is no matching friction
and as a result pure positive assortative matching in their children’s generation
is guaranteed. In that case, the premium of high educational investment does
not change with the fraction of parental households who actually choose the high
educational investment (the fraction of skilled individuals in the children’s gene-
ration)8. Without coordination frictions in the matching process, the rewards to
the high educational investment from the marriage market and the labor market
are certain according to the settings of the model. This certainty encourages edu-
cational investment because there is no chance for an unskilled individual to form
a rich household. By contrast, due to the coordination frictions in the matching
process, an unskilled individual may end up with a rich household while a skilled
individual may end up with a poor household and this uncertainty discourages
parental households’ incentive to make the high educational investment.
8Graphically, the origional downwards sloping premium curve in Figure 2.1 becomes a hori-
zontal line which is higher than the other two horizontal lines representing the loss of consump-
tion by the poor and the rich respectively.
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However, this implication is not consistent with the general opinion on the
role played by assortative mating in the intergenerational income mobility. Ty-
pically, people think assortative mating facilitates income stratification. This
viewpoint may arise based on the observation that assortative mating (assured
by arranged marriage) and social stratification co-exist in the traditional society
where social status, occupations and wealth are inherited. It is widely recorded
about traditional society across countries that income earned by different social
class is rigidly stratified and there is a little chance to realize intergenerational
income mobility by making intergenerational investment. Therefore, as long as
marriage is arranged to guarantee pure positive assortative mating, family income
is determined by householders’ family background and intergenerational income
mobility is very low. However, when we look at the modern society where income
is determined by individual’s productivity that largely depend on his/her human
capital accumulation, the rewards from labor market and marriage market can
be internalized in the decision-making process of educational investment made
by parental households. From the altruistic parents’ point of view, educational
investment provides a channel to realize high income for their children. In this
model, if the educational cost structure allows enough rewards and all the pa-
rental households have the access to the high educational investment, assortative
mating would enhance the incentive to make the high educational investment and
boost upward income mobility.
Based on the analysis above, though it is natural to associate assortative ma-
ting and intergenerational income stratification, there is no inevitable cause-effect
relationship between the two social phenomenon. Specifically, it is the education
system and labor market institution that are essential to the intergenerational
income mobility in the modern economy. In the next chapter, this static model
is extended to a dynamic one to reveal the transmission of household income
distribution over many generations. We will elaborate on the discussion of the
properties of income mobility as it is more appropriate in that context.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.2
To prove Lemma 2.2, this proof proceeds in two parts that discuss two cases res-
pectively: the one when s∗1 = 1, and the other when s
∗
1 ∈ (0, 1).
a. In the case where s∗1 = 1, let f(v) =
v
(1−v)e
−1(1−e− 1−vv ), g(α) = 2α
1+α
. It can




> 0, and limv→1 f(v) = e−1. Hence, if g(α) ≥ e−1,
(2.17) is held. The solution to g(α) = e−1 is: α = (2e − 1)−1. Thus, as long as
α ∈ ((2e− 1)−1, 1− 2e−1), (2.17) does not hold regardless of the value of v.
On the other hand, if g(α) < e−1, the comparison between f(v) and g(α) de-
pends on the relationship between v and α. va(α) is defined as the solution to
the equation which is derived from (2.17) by taking the equality sign:
v
(1− v)e
−1(1− e− 1−vv ) = 2α
1 + α
Hence, when α ∈ (0, (2e− 1)−1), as long as v ∈ [va, 1), (2.17) holds; otherwise,
given α lies in the same interval, if v ∈ (0, va), (2.17) does not hold.
Finally, consider the situation when all the type 2 boys choose to propose to
a type 2 girl, in other words, s2 = 0, then the expected payoff for the type 2 boys
would be: uem22 = P22up = (1 − s2)−1(1− es2−1)up. If any boy of type 2 deviates
from this pure strategy, switching to a type 1 girl, his expected payoff would
be the product of the probability that a type 1 girl does not get any proposal
from type 1 boys from any of the type 1 boys, and the expected household utility
generated by a type 1 girl and a type 2 boy: e−1 ur+up
2
. To support s2 = 0 as the









≤ (1− e−1)α (A.1)
The inequality (A.1)is reduced to α ≥ e−1
3e−1−1 , which contradicts the condition
in this case:0 < α ≤ 1 − 2e−1. Hence, s2 = 0 can not be supported as the type
2 boys’ strategy in the equilibrium when all the type 1 boys propose to type 1
girls.
b. In the case where s∗1 ∈ (0, 1), if all the type 2 boys choose to propose
to type 1 girls, s2 = 1, then the expected payoff for the type 2 boys would be:
uem21 = P21(ur + up)/2 =
v
1−ve
−s1(1 − e− 1−vv )ur+up
2
. If any boy of type 2 deviates
from this pure strategy, switching to type 2 girls, his expected payoff would be
the probability that a type 2 girl does not get any proposal from type 1 boys,
times the expected household utility generated by a type 2 boy and a type 2 girl:
e−
(1−s1)v
1−v up. To support s2 = 1 as type 2 boys strategy in the equilibrium, we need:
e−
(1−s1)v
1−v up ≤ v
1− v e
−s1(1− e− 1−vv )ur + up
2
(A.2)
where the relationship between v and s1 is determined by (2.15). Specifically,
according to (2.15), the RHS of inequality (A.2) e−
(1−s1)v




Substitute it back into (A.2), it can be shown that (A.2) does not hold in this
case. Hence, s∗2 = 1.
In the same way, if all type 2 boys choose to propose to type 2 girls, s2 =
0, then the expected payoff for the type 2 boys would be: uem22 = P22up =
e
−−v(1−s1)1−v
1−s2 (1−es2−1)up. If any boy of type 2 deviates from this pure strategy, swit-
ching to type 1 girls, his expected payoff would be the product of the probability
that a type 1 girl does not get any proposal from type 1 boys, and the expected
household utility generated by a type 2 boy and a type 1 girl: e−s1(ur + up)/2.







1− s2 (1− e
s2−1)up (A.3)
where the relationship between v and s1 is determined by (2.15). It can be
shown that (A.1) does not hold in this case. Hence, s∗2 = 0.
Finally, if the type 2 boys choose a mixed strategy s2 ∈ (0, 1), being indifferent












1− s2 (1− e
s2−1)up (A.4)
again, the relationship between v and s1 is determined by (2.15). It can be
shown that there is a unique solution satisfying the equation (A.4). Hence, in
the case s∗1 ∈ (0, 1), type 2 boys adopt a mixed strategy s∗2 ∈ (0, 1) in equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.3
To prove Lemma 2.3, this proof proceeds in 3 parts: Part a, Part b and Part c.
Part a shows the marginal benefit of making the high educational investment is
monotonic decreasing in the fraction of skilled offspring v; part b generates the
conditions under which parental households have the incentive to deviate from the
pure strategy kr = kp = 0, which indicates all the parental households uniformly
investing low and consequently v = 0; part c generates the conditions under
which parental households have the incentive to deviate from the pure strategy
kr = kp = 1, which indicates all the parental households uniformly investing high
and consequently v = 1.
a. Given any foreseeable joint educational investment strategy outcome, repre-
sented by the fraction of skilled persons in the offspring’s generation: v ∈ {0, 1},
the marginal benefit for parental households of switching from investing high to
investing low, or in other words, the marginal value of being a type 1 person in
the matching stage is:
R1 = β{P1r(v +Δv)ur + [1− P1r(v +Δv)]up − {[P2r(v)ur] + [1− P2r(v)]up}}
= β{[P1r(v +Δv)ur − P2r(v)]ur + [P2r(v)− P1r(v +Δv)]up}
= β{[P1r(v +Δv)− P2r(v)](ur − up)}
(A.5)
where P1r is shown as a function of v. R1 indicates when an incremental fraction
of type 1 offspring are produced, how much more utility they would generate as
the contribution to their parents’ utility than if they are type 2 person instead.
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β{[P1r(v +Δv)− P2r(v)](ur − up)}
= β{[P1r(v)− P2r(v)](ur − up)}





−s1(1− e− s2(1−v)v )](ur − up)
(A.6)
It can be shown that ∂R
∂v
< 0.
b. Consider the scenario where all the parental households choose the pure
strategy, kr = kp = 0, all making the low educational investment. If a small
fraction of households deviate from this pure strategy to make the high educa-
tional investment and sacrifice part of their consumption utility, skilled offspring
would be produced who can get matched without coordinate frictions due to the
small number, and form rich household at probability close to 1. The benefit of
this deviation differs between the rich and the poor parental households, which
is represented by dr and dp respectively as follows:
dr = u
c1
r + βur − uc2r − βup




p + βur − uc2p − βup
= uc1p − uc2p + β(ur − up)
(A.8)
Due to the concavity of utility function u(.), the poor parental household suf-
fer more by the high investment than the rich parental household: uc2r − uc1r <
uc2p − uc1p , equivalently, uc1r − uc2r > uc1p − uc2p , and dr > dp. Hence, so long as
dp > 0, both the rich and the poor households have incentives to deviate from
this pure strategy; dp < 0 < dr, the rich households have the incentive to deviate
from this pure strategy while the poor household would like to stay; dp < dr < 0,
both types of household would like to stay with this pure strategy.
c. Consider the scenario where all the parental households choose the pure
strategy, kr = kp = 1, all making the high educational investment. If a small
fraction of households deviates from this pure strategy to make the low educatio-
nal investment and enjoy a higher consumption utility, unskilled offspring would
be produced, their children’s probability of forming a household with a skilled
person would approximately equal to 1 as v is very close to 1. The benefit of this
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In the same way, due to the concavity of utility function u(.), uc2r − uc1r <
uc2p −uc1p , which leads to d′r < d′p. Hence, so long as d′r > 0, both the rich and the
poor households have incentives to deviate from this pure strategy; d
′
r < 0 < d
′
p,
the poor households have the incentive to deviate from this pure strategy while




p < 0, both types of
households would like to stay with this pure strategy.




p back into the analysis at
the end of part b and part c, we get the results shown in Lemma 2.3. In addition,
the Figure A.1 illustrate the six types of investment profiles as stated in Lemma
2.3.
A.3 Illustration of Properties of the Household
Formation
Properties of household formation can be illustrated by Figure A.2 to Figure
A.5. The four figures correspond to the four cases discussed in Lemma 2.1 and
Lemma 2.2 according to the separate parameter regions. Each of the following
figures consists of six sub-figures. From the top left to the top right, each of
the three sub-figures represents: the relationship between type 1 boys’ strategy
in the marriage market equilibrium s∗1 and the fraction of skilled individuals at
the beginning of the matching process, v; the relationship between type 2 boys’
strategy in the equilibrium s∗2 and v; the relationship between the difference in
the probabilities of forming a rich household as a type 1 boy and a type 2 boy
Pm∗1r − Pm∗2r and v. From the bottom left to the bottom right, each of the three
sub-figures represents: the relationship between the difference in the probabilities
of forming a rich household for a type 1 girl and a type 2 girl, P f∗1r − P f∗2r and
v; the average of the differences in probabilities, 1
2
[(Pm∗1r − Pm∗2r ) + (P f∗1r − P f∗2r )]
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against v; the relationship between v and w∗r .
Figure A.2 is a numerical example of the case where α ∈ (0, (2e− 1)−1) and
v ∈ [va, 1). The subfigures show s∗1 = s∗2 = 1; Pm∗1r − Pm∗2r = P f∗1r − P f∗2r , both
decreasing in v; v = w∗r .
Figure A.3 is a numerical example of the case where α ∈ (0, (2e− 1)−1) and
v ∈ (0, va). The subfigures show s∗1 = 1, s∗2 is increasing in v, and Pm∗1r − Pm∗2r =
P f∗1r − P f∗2r , both decreasing in v; v = w∗r . Figure A.4 is a numerical example of
the case where α ∈ [(2e− 1)−1, 1− 2e−1], s∗1 = 1 and s∗2 lies between the interval
(0, 1), increasing in v, and Pm∗1r −Pm∗2r = P f∗1r −P f∗2r , both decreasing in v; v = w∗r .
Figure A.5 is a numerical example of the case where α ∈ (1− 2e−1, 1), both s∗1
and s∗2 lies between the interval (0, 1), increasing in v, and P
m∗
1r −Pm∗2r = P f∗1r −P f∗2r ,
both decreasing in v; v = w∗r .
A.4 Comparative Statics
Figure A.6 gives a numerical example about how the premium of high educational














































































































(f) Type (vi) investment profile




























































































Figure A.2: Illustration of properties of the household formation, given α = 0.1




























































































Figure A.3: Illustration of properties of the household formation, given α = 0.1
























































































































































































Figure A.5: Illustration of properties of the household formation, given α = 0.3
52
Figure A.6: The premium of high educational investment against the fraction of
skilled offspring under different values of α, given βup = 100
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Chapter 3
Intergenerational Educational Investment and
Household Income Distribution over
Generations
Abstract
This chapter extends the static model in the previous chapter into a dy-
namic one. The household income disparity is held constant and exogenous
over time, while the fraction of rich households is endogenously determi-
ned over finite generations. The mechanism of the variation in income
distribution through the channel of educational investment and household
formation follows the spirit of the static model. A stationary fraction of
the rich households is generated by backward induction. Compared with
the results of the static model, a larger increase in the fraction of rich
households is more likely to happen in the dynamic setting than in the
static setting given a certain initial income distribution. This is because
the poor are better motivated to choose high educational investment when
they need to take more generations’ welfare into consideration.
Key Words: Income distribution, income mobility, educational invest-
ment
3.1 Introduction
Following the theoretical framework established by the static model in the pre-
vious chapter, the extended dynamic model presented in this chapter attempts
to capture the strategic thinking of parental households about the competition in
the offspring family formation process over many generations, and its implications
for intergenerational educational investment, the variation in income distribution
and income mobility.
Educational investment has been identified as a channel of upward income
mobility both by theoretical work1 and empirical studies2 on intergenerational
income mobility. Compared with developing countries where education is still
mainly financed by parental income, many developed countries have mature fi-
nancial system and government subsidies to support young people from poor
families in completing higher education. With these financial aids, the poor are
given more chance to have skilled offspring who in return gain a higher lifetime
income. However, the potential pre-college education costs of providing a good
learning environment are huge and involve many aspects of households’ econo-
mic activities, such as family location choice, extra curriculum allowance for the
children and so on. Rich parental households have advantages in financing bet-
ter but more expensive educational investment, through which their children, on
average, acquire more advanced skills and better platforms for their careers and
thus are more likely to get well paid positions in the job market. In short, the
financial advantages of rich households in making educational investment deci-
sions are common across countries, only differing in the extent. These advantages
become prominent when the costs of education go up, which worries the public
in the social mobility aspect. A very key question is, whether intergenerational
educational investment has become the channel of enhancing the financial advan-
tages of the rich, leading to a stratification of the social structure, or whether it
still functions as a major channel of upward income mobility?
To answer this research question, it is worth understanding the inequality in
education sector. Inequality in returns to education influences the incentive to
make educational investment, while inequality in access to education affects the
ability to make educational investment. Incentives in educational investment,
1See the seminal work by Becker (1962), Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986). More recently see
Benabou (2001).
2There is a large volume of empirical studies using data set across countries indicate that
educational investment contributes to upward income mobility. For a survey, see the work by
D’Addio (2007).
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inequality in return to education and education availability are well investiga-
ted in the literature on the relationship between income inequality and income
mobility.3 Among these studies, Hassler, Rodŕıguez Mora and Zeira (2007) dis-
tinguish two types of inequality which explain the different relationship between
income inequality and income mobility under a macro theoretical framework. It
reveals that a negative relationship between income inequality and income mobi-
lity may arise when the variation of country specific inequality in the education
sector (e.g. barriers to becoming skilled, costs of education) dominates. This is
because an unequal education system favors the skilled (the high income group)
who are able to accumulate advantages over generations. This is very likely to
result in a rigid social structure. By contrast, a positive relationship may arise
when the variation of country specific inequality in production sector dominates
(skill-biased wage inequality). This is because a large skill-biased wage inequality
increases people’s incentives to make educational investment, which contributes
to the upward income mobility.
In line with this insight in the relationship between inequality in education
sector and income mobility, this model (both the static one and the following
dynamic one) captures the inequality in returns to education by a constant ratio
of the household utility obtained from a high income to that from a low income.
Meanwhile, to capture the inequality in access to education, this model adopts a
differential cost structure. In addition, a concave utility function is employed to
reveal the fact that the poor parental household always suffers more than the rich
parental household from making the costly educational investment. The implica-
tions of this model are consistent with the insights of previous studies mentioned
above. An increase in cost of the high educational investment is harmful to the
upward income mobility, while an increase in the inequality of feasible household
income has an opposite effect.
Besides educational investment, intergenerational income mobility depends on
many other factors as explored firstly in Becker (1979), of which the inheritance
of physical capital, genetic heterogeneity and other endowments from parents like
caste, religion, etc have interested economists in recent decades. In this chapter
and the previous one, to make the model tractable, we assume that neither non-
human capital investment nor other forms of endowment are available to parents
as the channel of intergenerational economic status transmission.
3Recent research reveals both a positive and a negative relationship between income inequa-
lity and income mobility by making comparisons among countries. On the negative relationship,
see Solon (2004), Corak (2006), D’Addio (2007), Andrews and Leigh (2009), and on the positive
relationship see Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini(1999).
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In addition to educational investment, family formation process also plays
an important role in intergenerational economic status transmission. Positive
assortative matching in income in the marriage market, which has been observed
in empirical studies, contributes substantially to the rigidity of social structure4.
The contribution of this model is that it incorporates the family formation process
in a frictional matching environment into the analysis of strategic thinking over
intergenerational educational investment and its implications for income mobility.
Following the static model in the previous chapter, matching is not perfectly
assortative here and the ‘mismatch’ phenomenon is captured by coordination
frictions generated under the directed matching mechanism. It acknowledges
that the friction in the matching process is one of the sources of intergenerational
income mobility.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, by using a neutral household production
technology, these frictions do not affect the productivity of the education sector in
the sense that ‘who marries whom’ does not change the fraction of rich households
formed through the marriage market. The contribution of education sector to
the overall economy is determined only by the fraction of skilled individuals who
receive high educational investment. But frictions do affect the incentives of
intergenerational educational investment because the frictional matching process
creates chance for an unskilled individual of forming a rich household and a skilled
individual forming a poor household.
To elaborate on the role played by this neutral household production techno-
logy in the income distribution’s variation across generations, it is worth compa-
ring with other possible matching production technologies. In the directed search
literature on labor market, production technology is often assumed as skill-biased,
or in the terminology: supermodular. Among these studies, Shi (2002) explains
within-type wage dispersion as the result of directed search mechanism under
skill-biased production technology, where matching between heterogeneous firms,
who make endogenous investment, and heterogeneous workers with exogenous
type distribution, is partially mixed and socially efficient. In the literature fo-
4See the work by Lam and Schoeni (1994), which interprets the greater effect of father-in-
law’s schooling than that of father’s schooling on the wages of male workers in Brazil as an
indication of a high degree of assortative mating in the marriage market. Chadwick and Solon
(2002) present evidence on daughters’ intergenerational mobility in the United States with data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). They find that the assortative mating is an
important element in the intergenerational transmission process. In the study using German
Socio-Economic Panel and British Household Panel Survey, Ermisch, Francesconi and Siedler
(2005) find the assortative mating contributes 40%-50% to the covariance between parents’ and
own permanent family income. This effect is driven by a strong spousal correlation in human
capital, which is larger in Germany than Britain.
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cusing on the efficiency of matching in the non-transferable5utility environment,
where workers make endogenous investment, submodular production technology
leads to overinvestment by the high type and underinvestment by the low type
(Gall, Legros, Newman, 2009). Intuitively, we conjecture that when the house-
hold production technology changes to be supermodular, separating equilibrium
(skilled only propose to skilled, unskilled only propose to unskilled) in the mar-
riage market is plausible. It would take more generations to reach a stationary
household income distribution, and the fraction of rich households is lower than
that in this model. By contrast, if the household production technology is sub-
modular, the stationary fraction of rich households would be higher than that
in this model. This is because coordination frictions reduce the inefficiency in
overall output, which is caused by segregation under the non-transferable utility
environment and submodular household production technology.
The arrangement of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 introduces the frame-
work of this dynamic model based on the static one in the previous chapter. Sec-
tion 3 generates the equilibrium income distribution and income mobility rates,
where the effects of income disparity and education cost structures on the equi-
librium outcomes are also investigated. Section 4 provides concluding remarks
and discussions of the model’s main findings.
3.2 The Model
We consider a dynamic model across many but finite generations, using backward
induction to find out the variation pattern of income distribution. As in the sta-
tic model of the previous chapter, parental households decide whether to make a
high investment or a basic one on their children, to maximize their total utilities
by finding a balance between their own consumption utility and the welfare of
their offspring. To keep simplicity on the forward looking behavior, we have this
assumption as follows:
Assumption 1: People are partial rational in the marriage market before for-
ming households, in the sense that they anticipate that the inequality in feasible
5A term commonly used in the matching literature, which is in contrast to transferable utility.
The theoretical work on marriage by Becker (1973) is considered as under the transferable
utility framework, as is the work by Shimer and Smith (2000). The studies by Roth and
Sotomayor (1990) is considered as under the non-transferable utility framework, as is the work
by Smith(2006).
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household income will be a constant, which is denoted by α, where α ∈ (0, 1)6.
This assumption simplifies the strategies of marriage market participants,
which can be forecast by their parents when making educational investment deci-
sions. Compared with offspring’s partial rationality, parents can fully anticipate
variations in the difference between forming a rich household and forming a poor
household in different generations. Specifically, after the young generation grow
up, they become aware of the income distribution in their own generation and
its impact on the relative value of being rich or poor. Since parents possess the
ability of full rationality when making investment decisions on their own children,
the parental households in every generation are capable of foreseeing the beha-
vior of all the descendants’ behavior in the successive generations. They make
consumption-investment decisions with complete information of the income dis-
tributions in all the future generations. They believe that all the grown-up des-
cendants would choose an investment strategy that is the same as what they
would choose in that state.
Assume that all the households in the first generation are identical, earning low
income, recognized as the poor households. There is an educational investment
opportunity that could give their children some chance to form a household with
a higher income, recognized as the rich households. Given a parental household’s
income state vector (Q0r , Q
0
p) = (0, 1) in the first generation, generation 0, the
possibility of their descendants being rich or poor in generation t is denoted by




































































where Ktr and K
t
p are the investment strategy vectors of the rich parental hou-
sehold and the poor parental household of generation t respectively, which are
defined in section 2.4.1 of the previous chapter. Denote the probabilities of for-
ming a rich household for the generation t descendants by the column vector, P tir
6The concept of partial rational is borrowed from the paper by Burdett and Melvyn (1997)
“Marriage and class”, where agents believe that the sex ratio in the current marriage market
stays constant even though it may not.
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Both P tir and P
t
ip are determined by the exogenous variable α, and the fraction
of skilled individuals, vt, in generation t, which is pinned down by the rich and
the poor parental households’ joint investment strategies in generation t − 1 as
discussed in the static model. Based on the formulas shown above, it is obvious
to see that the descendants in generation t could possibly be rich or poor at
the probability Qtr and Q
t



































p) represents the state variable vector of the descendants. K
t−1
r =
(kt−1r , 1−kt−1r ), as the control variable vector for the rich households in generation
t − 1, denotes the investment strategy adopted by rich parental households in
generation t − 1 (t ≥ 1), while Kt−1p = (kt−1p , 1 − kt−1p ) denotes the investment
strategy chosen by the poor. The product of Kt−1r P
t
ir is the probability of a rich
household in generation t−1 (t ≥ 1), having rich offspring in generation t; Kt−1r P tip
is the probability of a rich household in generation t− 1 having poor offspring in
generation t; Kt−1p P
t
ir is the probability of a poor household in generation t − 1
having rich offspring in generation t; Kt−1p P
t
ip is the probability of a poor parental
household in generation t− 1 having poor offspring in generation t.
The dependence of Qtr or Q
t




p stems from the fact that
the rich/poor descendants in generation t may come from either the rich or the
poor households in generation t − 1. In particular, the rich parental households
and the poor parental households interplay with each other in generation t − 1,
and their investment strategies jointly determine the fraction of skilled people in
the next generation and ultimately pin down the chance of forming a rich or a
poor household in generation t, P tir or P
t
ip. Three elements altogether pin down
the state vector of their next generation, (Qtr, Q
t
p), according to the law of motion
described by the equation (3.1) and (3.2): first, the probability of forming a rich
household, P tir, and a poor household P
t
ip, of their next generation; second, their
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investment strategy profile, represented by the control variables, (Kt−1r , K
t−1
p );
third, the state of their own generation, (Qt−1r , Q
t−1
p ).
Hence, any change to the control variable vectors, Kt−1r and K
t−1
p , will yield
different pairs of the state variables (Qtr, Q
t
p) and those in the following genera-
tions. That is the effect of the current investment strategies on the state vectors
in the future generations. In addition, Kt−1r and K
t−1
p also have effects on the
payoffs of households in current generation directly. In each generation t (t ≥ 1),
the payoff of the rich household (the poor households, resp.) is the expected
consumption utility relying on their own investment strategy Ktr (K
t
p, resp.),















p ) are assumed to be constant over time, only depending on the exogenous
parameters, household income levels and the costs of educational investments.
Given an initial state (Q0r , Q
0





{(Ktr, Ktp); t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1} of investment strategies in each generation, the
evolution of the descendants’ chance of being rich or poor in the next gene-
ration is then determined by the law of motion according to equation (3.1)
and (3.2). Therefore, (Q0r , Q
0





z0,T = {(K(0,T−1)r , K(0,T−1)p ) ∪ (Q(1,T )r , Q(1,T )p )} as the feasible sequence. Given a
sequence z0,T , we can calculate the income distribution w
t
r, (t ≥ 1) in each genera-
tion, where wtr = Q
t
r, and 1−wtr = Qtp. The law of motion described in equation
(3.1) and (3.2) can be rewritten as:
wtr = (w
t−1
r , 1− wt−1r )(Kt−1r P tir, Kt−1p P tir)′ (3.3)
1− wtr = (wt−1r , 1− wt−1r )(Kt−1r P tip, Kt−1p P tip)′ (3.4)
Recall that we analyzed how the rich interplay with the poor when choosing
investment strategies to maximize their payoffs under a given initial income dis-
tribution in the static model of two consecutive generations. Similarly, in the
dynamic setting, the rich interplay with the poor through the control variable
vector Ktr and K
t





have non-zero elements, which means descendants can be rich or poor at some
positive probability in generation t. Because of this possibility, decision-makers in
generation t− 1 know that their offspring in future generations are likely to form
a rich household or a poor household. Hence they will have to foresee both Ktr




p by imagining themselves
being rich and poor respectively under every possible income distribution of the








p and the value of
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being rich or poor in generation t, under every possible income distribution wtr,
the maximum attainable value of the parental households in generation t− 1 can
be achieved by choosing the optimal Kt−1∗r , or K
t−1∗
p :
V t−1r = max
Kt−1r
{Kt−1r [(uc1r , uc2r )′ + βV tr P tir + βV tpP tip]} (3.5)
V t−1p = max
Kt−1p
{Kt−1p [(uc1p , uc2p )′ + βV tr P tir + βV tpP tip]} (3.6)
s.t.(3.3), (3.4), w0r = 0, V
T
r = ur, V
T
p = up
Equations (3.5) and (3.6) are the Bellman’s Equations (BE) for the rich pa-
rental households and the poor parental households respectively. These equations
characterize the optimal choice of the current control variables Ktr and K
t
p as the
solution to a static optimization problem in which the future consequences of cur-
rent parental households’ investment strategies are summarized by incorporating
the next generation’s value function into the current generation’s return function.
The solution to this static maximization problem gives the optimal values of the
current controls, Kt−1r and K
t−1
p as a function gt−1 of the current state, w
t−1
r ,
which is defined by (3.9).
In the following analysis, we will focus on the symmetric equilibrium under
the same exogenous parameters region as stated in Proposition 2.1, 1
2
β(ur−up) <
uc2r −uc1r < uc2p −uc1p < β(ur −up), which corresponds to the type (vi) investment
profile as categorized in Lemma 2.3. To compute the optimal control sequence,
we use backward induction starting from the last two generations and working
backwards. The second last generation’s maximization problem becomes:
V T−1r (w
T−1
r , T − 1) = max
KT−1r
{KT−1r [(uc1r , uc2r )′ + βSTr P Tir + βSTp P Tip ]} (3.7)
V T−1p (w
T−1
r , T − 1) = max
KT−1p
{KT−1p [(uc1p , uc2p )′ + βSTr P Tir + βSTp P Tip ]} (3.8)
st.(3.3), (3.4), w0r = 0, S
T
r = ur, S
T
p = up
where STr and S
T
p are the scrap value functions. The solution to the last two gene-
rations’ problem is exactly the same as in the static model stated by Proposition
2.1. Every possible combination of the parental households’ investment decisions
in generation T −1 jointly determines a corresponding fraction of rich households
wTr in their next generation. Rational parental households in generation T − 1
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would take into account the consequences of every possible wTr to their payoffs.
They also foresee that their children are the last generation who will consume up
all the household income so that the value of forming a rich household is equal
to ur and the value of forming a poor household is equal to up (both ur and up
are constant according to the model set-up).
To compute the value functions in generation T − 2, we need to know the re-
lationship between the controls KT−2r , K
T−2
p and the associated return in utilities
of offspring in generation T − 1. Let gT−1 denote the last policy function yielded
by the solution to (3.7) and (3.8), where gT−1 satisfies:





This policy function gT−1 maps wT−1r into the equilibrium investment strate-
gies of the parental households in generation T−1. Recall that every possible pair
of the control (KT−1∗r , K
T−1∗
p ) generated under different state variable w
T−1
r , leads
to a unique value of v∗T as the fraction of skilled individuals in generation T , so




to Property 1 of the household formation generated in the previous chapter) from
the policy function in the same manner as in the static model, which is shown in
Figure 2.2.
Moreover, by finding out the optimal investment strategies (KT−1∗r , K
T−1∗
p )
under every possible wT−1r as the solution to (3.7) and (3.8), we can compute
Vr(w
T−1
r , T − 1) that represents the value of being rich in generation T − 1 under
any given value of wT−1r , and Vp(w
T−1
r , T − 1) that represents the value of being
poor in generation T −1 under any given value of wT−1r . In particular, each wT−1r
corresponds to a unique pair of (Vr(w
T−1
r , T − 1), Vp(wT−1r , T − 1)). Each pair of
controls (KT−2r , K
T−2
p ) leads to a unique value of w
T−1
r . The relationship is pinned
down between the controls KT−2r , K
T−2
p and the associated utilities of offspring
in generation T − 1, V T−1r and V T−1p . By knowing this, the value functions of the
parental households of generation T − 2 can be computed.
V T−2r (w
T−2
r , T − 2) = max
KT−2r
{KT−2r [(uc1r , uc2r )′ + βV T−1r P T−1ir + βV T−1p P T−1ip ]}
V T−2p (w
T−2
r , T − 2) = max
KT−2p
{KT−2p [(uc1p , uc2p )′ + βV T−1r P T−1ir + βV T−1p P T−1ip ]}
s.t.(3.3), (3.4), w0r = 0, S
T




Based on the value function in T−2 described above, we can derive the corres-




p ), where gT−2 maps




p . The relation-
ship between wT−2r and v
T−1∗ (where wT−1∗=vT−1∗) can also be deduced from
this policy function. Proceeding in this manner, we eventually reach the initial
generation and solve equation (3.5) and (3.6) to derive the value functions of the
first generation and the first policy function, g0. The whole sequence of policy
functions {gt; t = 0, 1, 2, ...T − 1}, the corresponding income distribution and the
investment strategies can also be traced.
3.3 Equilibrium Income Distribution and Income
Mobility
Following the setting up of the static model in the last chapter, we employ a neu-
tral household production technology and the parameter region corresponding to
the type (vi) investment profile in the dynamic model setting of this chapter.
Therefore Property 1 and Property 2 of the household formation apply here as
well. According to Assumption 1, people are partial rational in the marriage mar-
ket, therefore the probabilities of forming a rich household, denoted by P t1r and
P t2r, are determined by the fraction of skilled individuals in their own generation,
vt and the exogenous variable α under the matching mechanism described in the
static model. (P t1r − P t2r) changes in α as illustrated in Proposition 2.3 of the
previous chapter.
Recall that we derived the relationship between the parental households’ in-
come distribution and their investment strategies by looking into the trade-off
between the consumption utility loss and the premium of high educational in-
vestment. Instead of foreseeing the difference in utilities of being rich and being
poor in the last generation, ur − up (that is a constant since the last generation
consume up all their income), the parental households in generation T − 2 would
anticipate that this inequality equals the difference between the value of being
rich and that of being poor in the offspring generation T − 1, (V T−1r − V T−1p )
(that is not a constant, since the households in generation T − 1 have to make
educational investment). As discussed in the static model, the rich and the poor
parental households interplay with each other in generation T − 1, and the opti-
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mal investment strategies, denoted by KT−1∗r and K
T−1∗
p , vary across three seg-
ments of wT−1 (vT−1)7 according to Proposition 2.1. Specifically, KT−1∗r = (1, 0)
and KT−1∗p = (
vTp −wT−1r
1−wT−1r , 1 −
vTp −wT−1r
1−wT−1r ) when w
T−1
r ∈ [0, vTp ]; KT−1∗r = (1, 0), and
KT−1∗r = (0, 1) when w
T−1






), KT−2∗r = (0, 1),
when wT−1r ∈ [vTr , 1]). Substitute the optimal values of KT−1r and KT−1p into
(3.7) and (3.8), the value of being rich and being poor in generation T − 1,
V T−1r (w
T−1
r , T − 1) and V T−1p (wT−1r , T − 1) are generated as follows (the argu-
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c2
p )




r ∈ [vTr , 1)
(3.11)
The high educational investment premium RT−2 = β(P T−11r − P T−12r )(V T−1r −
V T−1p ) is a function of the fraction of skilled offspring in generation T − 1, vT−1
(wT−1), and it is generally decreasing in vT−1 (wT−1). In particular, the pre-
mium of high educational investment, with which the generation T − 2 parental
households are confronted, varies across three segments of wT−1 as follows:
• when wT−1 ∈ [0, vTp ], equivalently vT−1 ∈ [0, vTp ], according to Proposition
2.1, the rich parental household in generation T − 1 chooses a dominant
pure strategy in equilibrium, kT−1∗r = 1, while the poor parental household
chooses a mixed strategy in equilibrium, kT−1∗p ∈ (0, 1), being indifferent
between the high investment and the low investment. Hence, the difference
between being the rich household and being the poor household in genera-
tion T − 1, denoted by (V T−1r − V T−1p ), is a constant that equals uc1r − uc1p .
Consequently, the high educational investment premium, with which the
generation T − 2 parental households are confronted, RT−2, is decreasing
in vT−1 (wT−1), and this decrease is fully contributed by the shrinking gap
7According to Property 1 of the household formation, wT−1=vT−1, so the two terms are
interchangeable in the following context.
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between the probability of forming a rich household of the skilled and that
of the unskilled in generation T − 1, (P T−11r − P T−12r );
• When wT−1 ∈ [vTp , vTr ], equivalently vT−1 ∈ [vTp , vTr ], the equilibrium paren-
tal household’s investment strategy profile in generational T−1, (kT−1∗r , kT−1∗p )
would be, (1, 0), the rich investing high and the poor investing low. Hence,
the difference between being rich and being poor in generation T − 1,
(V T−1r − V T−1p ), is no longer a constant. Instead, it contains a fixed part,
uc1r − uc2p , which is the difference in consumption utility between the rich
and the poor of generation T − 1, indicating that the rich invest high and
the poor invest low in generation T − 1. It also contains a variable part,
RT−1 = β[(P T−11r − P T−12r )(ur − up)], the premium of high educational in-
vestment for the generation T − 1 parental households, which is decreasing
in vT . Hence, the gap between the probability of the skilled and that of
the unskilled to form a rich household in generation T − 1, (P T−11r −P T−12r ),
has both a direct and an indirect effect (with respect to the variable part of
V T−1r −V T−1p ) on the premium of high educational investment for generation
T −2 parental households, RT−2 = β[(P T−11r −P T−12r )(V T−1r −V T−1p )], which
is then decreasing in vT−1 (wT−1) at a higher speed than (P T−11r − P T−12r )
decreases in vT−1 (wT−1);
• When wT−1 ∈ [vTr , 1), equivalently vT−1 ∈ [vTr , 1), the equilibrium paren-
tal household’s investment strategy profile in generation T − 1 would be,
kT−1∗r ∈ (0, 1) and kT−1∗p = 0. The rich parental household chooses a mixed
strategy, being indifferent between making the high investment and the
low investment, while the poor parental household chooses a pure strategy
making the low investment. Hence, the difference between being the rich
parental household and being the poor parental household of generation
T − 1 (V T−1r − V T−1p ) comes back to be a constant equal to uc2r − uc2p (by
setting c2 = 0 for simplicity, we have ur − up = uc2r − uc2p ). The premium
RT−2 decreases in vT−1 (wT−1) at the same rate as (P T−11r −P T−12r ) decreases
in vT−1 (wT−1).
Figure 3.1 visualizes the premium of high educational investment in genera-
tion T −2 by the red curve. As described above, this red premium curve consists
of three consecutive segments, illustrating the premium for parental households
in generation T − 2, RT−2 = β(P T−11r − P T−12r )(V T−1r − V T−1p ), against the frac-
tion of skilled individuals in generation T − 1, vT−1. The first segment of RT−2
in red overlaps the upper blue curve (representing β(P T−11r − P T−12r )(uc1r − uc1p ))
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since V T−1r − V T−1p = uc1r − uc1p according to the first case discussed above.
The second segment of RT−2 in red is steeper than the two blue curves since
(V T−1r − V T−1p ) = uc1r − uc2p + RT−1, and as a result, RT−2 is decreasing in wT−1
(vT−1) at a higher speed than (P T−11r − P T−12r ) decreases in wT−1 (vT−1). The
third segment of RT−2 in red overlaps the lower blue curve representing RT−1
(RT−1 = β[(P T−11r − P T−12r )(ur − up)]), since V T−1r − V T−1p = uc2r − uc2p = ur − up.
Point A is the intersection of the red premium curve and the horizontal line
that represents the rich households’ utility loss of consumption from making the
high educational investment, at which RT−2 = uc2r − uc1r , and it determines the
critical value of the poor parental household of generation T−2, vT−1r , which is the
same as that of generation T − 1. Point B is the intersection of the red premium
curve and the horizontal line that represents the poor households’ utility loss of
consumption from making the high educational investment, at which RT−2 =
uc2p − uc1p and it determines the critical value of the poor parental household of
generation T − 2, vT−1p .
RT1 ΒP1rT  P2rT urc2  upc2
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Figure 3.1: The premium of high educational investment and the loss of consump-
tion utility by parental households in generation T − 2 against the
fraction of skilled offspring in generation T − 1
Proceeding in the manner shown above, the premium curves of the high edu-
cational investment can be derived as shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. They
illustrate the trade-off between the premium derived from the high educational


























RT1 ΒP1rT  P2rT urc2  upc2
Figure 3.2: The premium of high educational investment and the loss of consump-
tion utility by parental households in generation T − 3 against the
fraction of skilled offspring in generation T − 2
educational investment for parental households in generation T − 3, as well as in
the previous generation T − 4 respectively. In Figure 3.2, Point C corresponds
to the critical value of the poor parental household of generation T − 3, vT−2p ,
at which RT−3 = uc2p − uc1p , and vT−2r is still represented by Point A, at which
RT−3 = uc2r − uc1r . In Figure 3.3, Point D corresponds to the critical value of the
poor parental household of generation T − 4, vT−3p , at which RT−4 = uc2p − uc1p ,
and vT−3r is still represented by Point A, at which R
T−4 = uc2r − uc1r .
Through the figures shown above, we can see that the dynamics of this trade-
off over generations that is revealed by the colored curves in a backward manner.
Notice that those colored curves each consist of three consecutive segments, and
converge to a fixed one in generation T − S when S is large enough, which is
illustrated by Figure 3.4. Point Z corresponds to the critical value of the poor
parental household of generation T −S, vT−S+1p = v1p , at which RT−S = uc2p −uc1p ,
and vT−S+1r is still represented by Point A, at which R
T−S = uc2r − uc1r .
The features of the premium curves through generations determine the pattern
of the corresponding policy functions, as they indicate that the pattern of how the
poor households’ critical value, vtp changes. v
t
p increases at a decreasing rate in a
backward manner through generations, which is in contrast to the rich households’
































RT1 ΒP1rT  P2rT urc2  upc2
Figure 3.3: The premium of high educational investment and the loss of consump-
tion utility by parental households in generation T − 4 against the
fraction of skilled offspring in generation T − 3
all the way back to the first generation.
The policy function through generations can be illustrated by Figure 3.5. In
Figure 3.5, the horizontal axis represents the state variable, wt−1r , which is the
fraction of rich parental households in each generation t − 1, and the vertical
axis represents the values of control variables, kt−1∗r and k
t−1∗
p , which are the
optimal investment strategies adopted by the rich parental households and the
poor parental households respectively. The rich parental households’ investment
strategy is still represented by the blue curve, as it is in Figure 2.3, while the
red curve is for the poor parental households’ investment strategy. In this figure,
kT−1∗r = k
0∗
r , which shows that the rich parental households’ investment strategy
under any given income distribution indicator wtr in their own generation does not
change through time. It equals 1 when the fraction of rich parental households
wt−1r is below the critical value v
t





The underlying reason for its time-invariant pattern over generations is, the rich
households’ critical value vtr stays the same over generations, as indicated by
vtr = v
1
r , t = 1, 2, ...T . On the other hand, the poor households’ investment
strategies vary across the last several generations.































RT1 ΒP1rT  P2rT urc2  upc2
Figure 3.4: The premium of high educational investment and the loss of consump-
tion utility by parental households in generation T − S against the
fraction of skilled offspring in generation T − S + 1
sents the poor households’ investment strategies over the last several generations.
The one in red representing kT−1∗p shifts rightwards as the time goes back, and
converges to a fixed one in blue representing KT−S∗p at some generation T − S
when S is large enough. In other words, as the generation becomes closer to the
last one, the curve representing the poor households’ investment strategy kt−1∗p




r is below v
t




p equals 0 when
wt−1r reaches v
t
p and beyond. As t gets closer to T after generation T−S, the poor
households are less tolerant of the competitiveness from the increased fraction of
skilled in the next generation. They tend to choose a pure investment strategy,







To summarize the analysis shown above, we get the conclusion that, given
the parameter region, 1
2
β(ur − up) < uc2r − uc1r < uc2p − uc1p < β(ur − up), the
policy function g(wtr) mapping the w
t−1
r into the optimal value of the current
control of the rich parental household, Kt−1∗r , does not change over generations,
while it does change when mapping the wt−1r into the optimal value of the current
control of the poor parental household, Kt−1∗p , if the system gets close enough to






































Figure 3.5: Policy function through generations: optimal investment strategies
against the fraction of rich households in each generation
making the high educational investment as the generation gets closer to the last
one.
Compared to the second last generation, the poor parental households in any
previous generation would be more willing to compete with the rich households in
making the high educational investment. The intuition could be that, unlike the
parental households in the second last generation, those parents in the previous
generations consider that their children are going to make educational investment
on their grandchildren, and they know that the poor households always suffer
more than the rich ones when making educational investment. The poor parental
households in generation t where t < T−1 are more eager than those in generation
T − 1 to catch up with the rich in order to relieve their children from being in
an inferior position. This eagerness reduces as the system gets closer to the last
one, for there are less and less generations of their descendants having to make
educational investment. Compared to those in the earlier generations, the poor
parental households in the second last generation are the least anxious ones to
relieve their children from being poor. This is because the disadvantages of being
in a poor household in the last generation are less than those in the previous
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generations as people do not need to make any educational investment when
they are the last generation.
Based on the pattern of the policy function described above, we can also map
the parental households’ income distribution indicator wt−1r into their children’s
skill distribution indicator vt∗ in equilibrium as we did in the static model. As vtp
starts to decrease when t is close enough to T , this relationship changes corres-
























Figure 3.6: The fraction of rich households against the equilibrium fraction of
skilled individuals through generations
The horizontal axis in Figure 3.6 represents the fraction of rich households in
generation t− 1, which is the parental generation from the perspective of people
in generation t. The vertical axis represents the equilibrium fraction of skilled
individuals in generation t. Like the static model, this relationship is illustrated
by three segments of the line. When any exogenous value of wt−1r is below v
t
p,
we have vt∗ = vtp , which is represented by the horizontal line segment in the left





vt∗ = wt−1r , which is represented by the 45
◦ line segment; when wt−1r exceeds the
rich parental households’ critical value vtr, we have v
t∗ = vtr, which is represented
by the horizontal line segment in the right upper corner. Compared with Figure
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2.2 in the previous chapter, the relationship between vt∗ and wt−1r varies in the last
several generations due to the variation in the critical value, vtp, which is generated
in this dynamic system. This variation is illustrated by a group of colored curves
in the left lower corner in Figure 3.6. Given this relationship between wt−1r and
vt∗, we arrive at the equilibrium income distribution and investment strategies
for the rich and the poor households in the dynamic system.
Proposition 3.1 Given the parameter region, 1
2
β(ur − up) < uc2r − uc1r < uc2p −
uc1p < β(ur−up) and w0r = 0, the income distribution becomes stationary after the
first generation along the equilibrium path through generations, where wt∗r = v
1
p
and t > 0. Meanwhile Kt∗r and K
t∗
p are constant vectors, K
t∗




Proof. See Appendix B.1
This proposition can be illustrated by Figure 3.7. The right half of the graph
replicates Figure 3.6 and it illustrates the relationship between the fraction of
rich parental households and the equilibrium fraction of skilled offspring in the
next generation. The left half of the graph visualizes Property 1 of the household
formation in the previous chapter which states that the fraction of rich house-
holds equals the fraction of skilled individuals in every generation, wtr = v
t. By
combining the two subfigures, it is possible to visualize the dynamics of income
distribution over generations.
Let’s start from the first generation where an initial income distribution is
imposed as w0r = 0. The relationship between the fraction of rich parental house-
holds in first generation and the equilibrium fraction of skilled individuals in the
next generation is illustrated by the blue curve that consists of three segments.
Along the blue arrow, we can see that when w0r = 0, the corresponding v
1∗ is
generated by the blue curve, where v1∗ = v1p. According to Property 1 of the
household formation illustrated by the left half of the graph, the second genera-
tion’s income distribution w1r is equal to v
1, where w1∗r = v
1∗ = v1p. Taking this
w1∗r back to the right half of the graph, we see that even though the relationship
between the fraction of rich parental households in the second generation and the
equilibrium fraction of skilled individuals in the next generation may change, as
represented by the yellow curve8, v2∗ is still equal to v1∗, since w1∗r lies between
v2p and v
t






p. Proceeding in this manner, even
8Notice that only the line segment in the left lower corner can be seen in yellow since the
other two segments are overlapped by other lines in blue
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though vtp moves leftwards from some generation, it has no effects on the equi-
librium income distribution in generation t, wtr, because v
t
p ≤ v1p . The income
distribution becomes stationary after the first generation, wt∗r = v
1
p (t ≥ 1) as
































Figure 3.7: The fraction of rich households along the equilibrium path through
generations
Notice that for any exogenous value of the initial income distribution indi-
cator in the first generation, w0r , where w
0
r ≤ v1p, the stationary fraction of rich
households in equilibrium would be, wt∗r = v
1
p (t ≥ 1). For any value of w0r where
v1p ≤ w0r ≤ v1r , the stationary fraction of rich households in equilibrium would be,
wt∗r = w
0




r ≤ w0r < 1, the stationary fraction of rich
households in equilibrium would be, wt∗r = v
1
r .
It is also interesting to check the income mobility rates for the rich households
and the poor households respectively. Here the mobility rate of the rich is the
probability of their children forming a poor household in the next generation
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(downward income mobility rate), and that of the poor is the probability of their
children forming a rich household in the next generation (upward income mobility
rate). Let P trp and P
t
pr denote the two concepts here respectively, where:










According to Proposition 3.1, wt∗r remains stationary after the first genera-






p (t ≥ 1) are constant vectors.
Consequently, P t∗rp and P
t∗
pr are constants too. Specifically, we have K
t−1∗
r = (1, 0)








2r . Proposition 3.2
elaborates on the properties of intergenerational income mobility in this dynamic
model.
Proposition 3.2 Along the equilibrium path, if wt∗r ≥ 12 , P t∗pr ≤ P t∗rp, t ≥ 1; if
wt∗r ≤ 12 , P t∗pr ≥ P t∗rp , t ≥ 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.2
Proposition 3.2 implies that when the income distribution becomes statio-
nary as stated in Proposition 3.1, a smaller fraction of skilled individuals leads
to a higher matching probability of getting matched with an unskilled indivi-
dual. As a result, this dynamic system yields a higher probability of forming
a poor households in general. On the other hand, a larger equilibrium fraction
of skilled individuals leads to a higher matching probability of getting matched
with a skilled individual, and consequently a higher probability of forming a rich
household in general.
Based on the results in Proposition 3.2, the equilibrium fraction of rich house-
holds w∗r affects income mobility. Since the income disparity parameter α impacts
on wt∗r , it also has an indirect effect on income mobility rates, which is elaborated
on as follows.
Remark 3.1 Given education costs c1, c2 and the household utility gained from
the low income up unchanged, a decrease in the income inequality parameter α
leads to larger critical values, v1r and v
1
p, which generates a higher w
∗
r in equili-
brium. Consequently, P ∗rp is increasing in α, while P
∗
pr is decreasing in α.
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This remark is consistent with the results of comparative statics in the pre-
vious chapter. It is illustrated by Figure B.3 in Appendix. By holding the same
parameter region, we restrict our focus on type (vi) investment profile as is ana-
lyzed in this chapter. This remark says that when the income disparity increases,
equivalently as α decreases, an individual from a rich parental household is less
likely to form a poor household, and an individual from a poor parental house-
hold is more likely to form a rich household. This is mainly due to the fact that
a smaller α creates more incentive for households to make the high educational
investment, which leads to a larger fraction of rich households as well as a larger
fraction of skilled individuals in the equilibrium.
On the other hand, the effect of inequality in education cost has an opposite
effect on the equilibrium outcome, which is elaborated upon as follows:
Remark 3.2 Given α and c2 unchanged, an increase in the cost of the high edu-
cational investment, c1, would increase the suffering from making the high educa-
tional investment for both the rich and the poor. It also increases the difference
in this suffering of the rich and that of the poor. According to Proposition 3.1
and 3.2, this increase leads to a smaller equilibrium fraction of rich households,
w∗r . Consequently, P
∗
rp is increasing in c1, while P
∗
pr is decreasing in c1.
Remark 3.2 says that when the high educational investment cost increases, all
the households suffer more from investing high but the poor’s suffering is more
severe by this increase than the rich. The equilibrium downward income mobility
rate P ∗rp increases in c1, while the equilibrium upward mobility rate P
∗
pr decreases
in c1. A larger inequality in education costs leads to a smaller fraction of rich
households, which is harmful to the total output of the economy and to the up-
ward mobility rate.
In summary, we so far have extended the static model to a dynamic one, where
family members span several generations. It follows the parameter region of type
(vi) investment profile defined in the static model, where 1
2
β(ur−up) < uc2r −uc1r <
uc2p −uc1p < β(ur−up). It is possible that both the rich and the poor household may
choose a mixed investment strategy under a certain exogenous income distribution
of their own generation. For simplicity, we set the initial income distribution w0r =
0 in generation 0. It will not change the main results if any other value of w0r is
imposed. The household income distribution becomes stationary in equilibrium as
stated in Proposition 3.1. Therefore, given an identical initial income distribution,
e.g. w0r = 0, we can compare the equilibrium household income distribution and
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income mobility rate in the static model with these in the dynamic one. It is
obvious that in both systems, there is an increase in the fraction of rich households
from the initial generation to the offspring generations given w0r = 0, and this
fraction becomes stationary in dynamic setting. The amount of increase is larger
in the dynamic setting than that in the static setting, because the poor are better
motivated to choose high educational investment when they need to take more
generations’ welfare into consideration. As a result, a larger fraction of skilled
offspring is generated in equilibrium under dynamic system.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In the model discussed above, this dynamic system generates a stationary hou-
sehold income distribution and household income mobility rates along the equi-
librium path. The randomness that stems from frictions in the family formation
process and the induced mixed investment strategies adopted by parental house-
holds contribute to the variation in income distribution before it arrives at the
stationary state. As both the inequality in education costs and the inequality in
returns to education affect the equilibrium fraction of rich households, this model
implies that an increase in the cost of high educational investment alone would
decrease the equilibrium fraction of rich households as well as upward income
mobility; while an increase in returns to the high educational investment alone
would increase the equilibrium fraction of rich households as well as upward in-
come mobility. This result is consistent with previous studies on inequality and
mobility mentioned in the introduction.
Following the spirit of the static model, the directed matching mechanism
which is used to model the family formation process generates critical values
for the parental households in terms of the fraction of skilled offspring in the
next generation. As the premium of high educational investment declines in the
fraction of households who choose high educational investment (which is equal to
the fraction of skilled offspring in the next generation), it indicates that there is a
“given” number of skilled being produced so that the loss in consumption utility
can be compensated by the high educational investment premium.
Due to the difference in suffering from consumption utility loss by costly edu-
cational investment, the rich are able to crowd out the poor if they can produce
this “given” number of skilled offspring all by themselves. Hence, we can not
evaluate the education cost structure’s effects alone on the future income dis-
tribution and income mobility, as it is a relative term compared to the current
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income distribution and future income inequality. In the case when the cost of
the high educational investment goes up, the poor may still be willing to pay the
education costs if the associated labor market returns to this investment is large
enough, or from the family formation process aspect, if there are not enough rich
households in the current generation so that they are not able to crowd out the
poor from making the high educational investment. Otherwise, this congestion
effect of family formation competition would make the poor find the chance of
their children forming a rich household too small and give up making the high
educational investment.
The policy implication of this model is that a low cost for people to access
the high education would enhance the incentives to make educational investment.
This effect is stronger to the poor than to the rich, which would boost the up-
ward income mobility and the overall output of the economy. On the other hand,
the inequality of labor income should not worry policy makers as long as the
labor market institution is effecient. A high degree of inequality of income would
encourage people to make educational investment if the costs of education do
not hurt them too much. Considering economic growth based on human capital
accumulation in the context of the dynamic setting, it is essential to preserve a
certain fraction of skilled workers in the economy especially when the technology
improves rapidly. Public financial support aiming at reducing the high educa-
tional costs would boost upward income mobility, which makes the poor more
tolerate about the inequality of labor income from sociology viewpoint. In ad-
dition, it would also generate larger fraction of skilled workers in the long run,
which improves a country’s production technology level and economic output.
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Appendix B
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
According to the properties of household formation stated in the static model,
given any value of the parental household income distribution wt−1r , the fraction
of skilled offspring in the next generation vt∗ generated along the equilibrium
path equals the income distribution of that generation wt∗r . Given w
0
r = 0, all the
households are poor and they would choose a mixed investment strategy k0∗p = v
1
p,




p . Though the relationship
between wt−1r and v
t∗ along the equilibrium path represented by Figure 7 varies
over the last several generations due to the movement of the critical value vp,






p is the maximum of v
t
p. Hence, after first
generation, wt∗r = v
t∗ = v1p, and K
t∗
r = (1, 0), K
t∗
p = (0, 1) according to Lemma
2.3.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Given t > 0, P t+1∗1r ≥ P t+1∗2r , and P t∗rp = P t+1∗1p = 1 − P t+1∗1r , P t∗pr = P t+1∗2r , which
then leads to: P t∗rp ≤ 1 − P t∗pr . According to Proposition 3.1, the wt∗r becomes
stationary along the equilibrium path after generation 0, which indicates that
the number of the rich households that fall to be poor equals the number of the
poor households that rise to be rich between any two consecutive generations,




pr(1−wt∗r ). Hence, we get P1pP2r = 1wr − 1. Then comes
the conclusion: if wt∗r ≥ 12 , P t∗pr ≤ P t∗rp ; if wt∗r ≥ 12 , P t∗pr ≥ P t∗rp .
Note that it is possible that v1p = v
1
r . In that case, the poor households
and the rich households’ critical values equal to each other, indicating that the
rich households in the first generation will not have a space of actions which can
crowd out the poor from making the high educational investment. In other words,
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the rich and the poor will choose the same investment strategy, which results in
P 1pr = P
1
rp under any value of w
0
r .


















































Figure B.1: v1p and v
1
r increase as α decreases
In Figure B.1, as α decreases, the upper blue curve representing β(P T1r −
P T2r)(u
c1




the lower blue curve representing RT−1 = β(P T1r−P T2r)(ur−up) = β(P T1r−P T2r)( 1α−
1)up shifts to the lower purple curve representing R
T−1′ = β(P T1r−P T2r)( 1α′ −1)up.






r . The original premium curve RT−S = β(P T−S+11r −
P T−S+12r )(V
T−S+1







r − V T−S+1′p ) in pink. Consequently, the intersection points A
and Z change to A′ and Z ′. v1p and v
1





B.4 Illustration of Remark 3.2
In Figure B.2, as c1 increases, the horizontal line representing u
c2











































Figure B.2: v1p and v
1
r decrease as c1 increases
shifts to the upper purple horizontal line representing uc2p −uc
′
1
p ; the horizontal line




r . The original premium curve RT−S = β(P T−S+11r − P T−S+12r )(V T−S+1r −
V T−S+1p ) in aqua changes to a new one R
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Product Line Competition with Vertical and
Horizontal Differentiation: An Application to
the Scheduled Flight Market
Abstract
This chapter studies a duopoly air-travel market between a city-pair.
Scheduled flights can be differentiated along the quality dimension: one-
stop or non-stop, and the variety dimension: departure times. Consumers
are heterogeneous in their valuation over the quality of flights and their
preferences over departure times. Conditions are generated under which a
hub-and-spoke network carrier provides non-stop flights along an interlaced
schedule, or one-stop flights at the same schedule adopted by its competi-
tor, a point-to-point network carrier. It also indicates that higher quality
difference makes the consumers less sensitive to the flight frequency. Hence
the two carriers prefer to be specialized in different quality of flights and
adopt the same schedule.
Key Words: Vertical differentiation, horizontal differentiation, pro-
duct line competition
4.1 Introduction
The multi-faceted nature of the modern-day air travel market presents various
obstacles and challenges for analysis. Chief among these obstacles is the involve-
ment of various parties and stakeholders, including authorities, airlines, aircraft
manufactures, airports, and passengers who, combined with exogenous economic
and political forces, have contributed towards the current state-of-affairs within
the industry. One of the major trends over the last two decades has been the
meteoric rise of low-cost carriers in the North American and European air travel
markets. In contrast to the traditional carriers’ hub-and-spoke network which
provides connection flights as well as direct flights, the low-cost carriers have
adopted a point-to-point network which provides only direct flights between city-
pairs.
Hub-and-spoke network operation emerged and has been widely adopted by
traditional carriers after the deregulation of airline industry of US in late 1970s.
The major objective of the hub-and-spoke network design is to reduce costs (both
marginal cost and fixed cost) by providing connection flights, taking advantage of
economies of scale, scope, density. There is a large literature providing empirical
evidence in support of cost saving by the hub-and-spoke network (Brueckner,
Dyer and Spiller, 1992; Brueckner and Spiller, 1994; Berry, 1990, 1996). Another
reason why the hub airport is preferred by the hub carriers is that it can be
used as a ‘fort’, which enables its major users to increase entry barriers and set
higher prices for hub-originating passengers (Borenstein, 1989, 1991; Berry, 1990,
1996). These effects suggest that the hub-and-spoke network structure generates
significant market power that would make it possible for the traditional carriers
(hub-and-spoke network carriers) to sustain high prices and deter potential entry
into the market. However, this market power has been threatened by a new
business model implemented by Southwest, a US ‘no frills’ discount airline. This
business model takes a new way of costs saving. Typically, it largely reduces costs
by increasing seat density, daily aircraft utilization and reducing crew costs, sales
costs etc. Further, by using secondary airports and operating in the ‘rim’ route1,
low-cost carriers largely steer clear from the entry barriers. This business model
was studied and copied by many firms in America (e.g. Frontier, AirTran Airways,
Jetblue, etc.), Europe(e.g. Ryanair, Easyjet, Vueling, Air Berlin etc.) and some
other countries. While the market development of low-cost airlines has reached
1The route consists of two endpoint cities which are typically connected by one-stop flights
operated by hub carriers.
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its maturity in America, currently believed to be in its consolidation stage in
Canada, UK and Europe Mainland, and still in proliferation stage in the rest of
the world (European Parliament Study, 2007). Some of the hub carriers have
launched ‘no frill’ division (airline in airline, e.g. Buzz in KLM, Delta Express
in Delta Airlines, MetroJet in US Airways, etc.) operating direct flights as a
response to the penetration of the low-cost carriers. However, most of these
divisions (airline in airline) of the hub carriers turn out to perform badly due to
various factors associated with their parental companies, such as limits of fleet
expansion, union’s opposition and cost reduction challenges (Doganis, 2001).
The competition between the two business models has been elaborately stu-
died from various aspects of the underlying cost-reduction strategies. For example,
it is generally agreed that longer routes (about 1,000 miles and above) are more
suitable for the hub-spoke network’ style of cost reduction due to aircraft confi-
gurations, while the shorter ones seem to favor the ‘no frill’ style. In the past two
decades, low-cost carriers have occupied much of the market for intra-European
travel that traditional carriers left open by reducing the number of flights, while
cross-continent travel markets are dominated by the traditional carriers with their
hub-and-spoke network. On the other hand, one cabin class, minimum in-flight
service and standerized fleet are the typical features of cost-reduction made by
low-cost carriers, which provide less comfort flight to the leisure travellers. Howe-
ver, recent trend in airline industry shows a tendency of convergence of the two
business model. For example, European second largest low-cost carrier Easyjet
starts to provide two cabin classes from 2012 to draw more business customer;
Norwegian shuttle, another low-cost carrier, have launched long-haul routes from
the Scandinavian capitals to New York and Bangkok recently; while SAS, the
flag-carrier of the Scandinavian countries with three hubs in Oslo, Stockholm and
Copenhagen, began to reduce its unit cost from 2008 by learning from low-cost
carriers’ experience.
As industrial observers point out, all the airlines may look the same in the
near future and it may be trivial to clarify the identity of carriers (low-cost or the
traditional) when analyzing the competition of airline industry. However, what
kind of flights are provided in the market and how much of them have always
been the major concerns of air-travellers. The very likely valuation of flights in
the future air-travel market may be less about other characteristics of flights but
the most important two of them: flight duration and departure times. Following
this viewpoint, it is very interesting to investigate the competition between a
hub-and-spoke network carrier and a point-to-point network carrier in a city-pair
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air-travel market where both of them do not have relative cost advantages against
each other (it is feasible for a one-stop flight incurring the same costs as a non-
stop one). The directness of non-stop flights generates less flying hours, and it
is regarded as the feature of the higher quality compared with the undesirable
one-stop flights. Carriers have the options to set different departure times of
their flights, which is recognized as horizontal differentiation since consumers
have different preferences over departure times.
The research question of this chapter is: how does a hub-and-spoke network
carrier interact with a point-to-point network carrier in regard to product line
location arrangement and product quality choice? The results have implications
on the demand of different sizes of aircrafts. For convenience, the hub-and-spoke
network carrier is referred to as the hub carrier and the point-to-point network
carrier is referred to as the PTP carrier in the following context. In the model, a
hub carrier has the choice to provide one-stop flights or non-stop flights by opera-
ting on its hub-and-spoke network, and a PTP carrier can only provide non-stop
flights by operating on its point-to-point network. Consumers are assumed to be
heterogeneous in their valuation of the flight quality (flight duration) and prefer-
red departure time. In addition, those with high valuation of the quality suffer
more from a flight at an undesirable departure time. Any price discrimination,
based on the type of cabin class or advance booking days, towards targeted group
of consumers is not considered in this model, and the costs of the two service types
are assumed to be zero in the model for simplification purposes.
The framework is based on the literature on two-dimensional product differen-
tiation (Degryse, 1996; Economides, 1989; Neven and Thisse, 1990). Specifically,
this paper closely follows the model proposed in Degryse (1996), which deals with
product differentiation within the banking industry. The model specified below
differs from Degryse’s model in four key aspects. First, each one of the duopolists
provides a product line in this model rather than a single product by each firm, so
that the scale of product line matters. It is reasonable since frequency of flights
(related to the scale of product line) matters in the air-travel market. Second,
duopolists in this model are allowed to choose their product line location in two
polar strategies: head-to-head or interlaced, while the locations are fixed and
exogenous in Degryse’s banking model. This flexibility of product location fits
better with scheduled flight market since choosing a schedule involves strategic
thinking in carriers’ competition. Third, the competition between the duopolists
is asymmetric in the sense that one of them (the PTP carrier) always provides
high quality services (non-stop flights), so it only needs to make decisions on the
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location, while the other player (the hub carrier) needs to make decisions on both
the location and the quality of its services. Finally, the players move sequen-
tially in this model rather than simultaneously. The sequence of moves follows
the conjecture that the hub carrier takes more time in making strategic decisions
on product line competition since it needs to decide both the flight quality and
the flight schedule while the PTP carrier only needs to make decisions on the
schedule.
With regard to the second point mentioned above, the model by Klempe-
rer (1992) also endogenizes location choices partially as in the form of only two
polar strategies: head-to-head and interlaced. This simplification is due to the
complexity of endogenizing location choices in product differentiation models. In
Klemperer’s model, it is argued that shopping cost’s existence may cause head-
to-head competition less competitive, which sheds some light on the results of
this model as well. One result of this model is that by competing head-to-head in
terms of the flight schedule, both carriers are able to charge higher prices and earn
higher profits when they specialize in different quality of flight (one-stop flights
vs. non-stop flights). Moreover, when shopping costs are considered as the se-
cond dimension of product characteristic, its conclusion is consistent with a more
general prediction of multi-characteristics space competition model by Irmen and
Thisse (1998), which states that firms tend to maximize differentiation in the
dominant characteristic and to minimize differentiation in other characteristics.
There is a growing literature focused on how the hub carriers responds to
PTP carriers’ entry. Cento (2008) investigates the price competition between
airlines in various market structures, e.g. monopoly, symmetric duopoly, asym-
metric duopoly, asymmetric oligopoly, etc. With the assumption that consumers
are both horizontally and vertically heterogeneous (which refers to the consu-
mers’ physical distance from airports and their valuation of the cabin classes)
equilibrium outcome varies across different market structures. Dunn (2007) em-
pirically examines the factors affecting non-stop services in ‘rim’ markets. The
results provide evidence on the cannibalization effect2 between a carrier’s own
one-stop services and non-stop services, which deters the hub carrier’s entry into
non-stop services in the ‘rim’ markets.
Different from the related models mentioned above, the main concern of the
following model is the strategic interaction between the hub carrier and the PTP
2The hub carrier’s non-stop flights as the modified products exert a negative effect on the
hub carrier’s profits with respect to its one-stop flights, which is considered as a form of ‘can-
nibalization’.
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carrier on the product line competition and two-dimensional differentiation rather
than complicated price schemes designed by carriers. Hence, the model assumes
a simple price scheme under which each carrier sets a uniform price across its
own product line. For simplification purpose, no competition between two types
of services within one carrier is considered in this model. The hub carrier chooses
to provide only one type of flights: one-stop or non-stop, while the PTP carrier
always provides non-stop flights. Moreover, the analysis is made in a duopoly
market only, and studies with the same research interest but under other market
structures could be an extension of this model.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the set-up of the
model. Section 3 generates equilibrium prices in the final stage of the game.
Section 4 characterizes Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Section 5 provides a
discussion of the model’s main findings.
4.2 The Model
Consider a duopolistic scheduled flight market consisting of a hub-and-spoke net-
work carrier (the hub carrier for short) H and a point-to-point network carrier
(the PTP carrier for short) L both operating n flights per week between a city
pair. This model focuses on a short run strategic interplay between the two types
of carriers in terms of product line position, product quality choice and pricing.
By short run, it means both carriers arrange in advance the flight schedule, the
flight type (one-stop vs. non-stop) and the corresponding prices of a short ca-
lendar period (e.g. one month). To focus on the product line differentiation,
this model only considers a simplified pricing scheme. It rules out any kind of
price discrimination3, which is commonly applied in the air-travel industry (also
referred to as ‘yield management’ or ‘revenue management’ in practice). In this
model, each carrier choose a uniform price across its own product line instead.
The feature of schedules available to the two carriers is characterized as fol-
lows. Schedules denote the position/location of the product line in this model.
As the characteristic of horizontal differentiation, it is modeled in Salop circle
style. The whole circle represents a time period of one week. Each carrier’s n
scheduled flights in the city-pair market are located at equal distances from each
other on the circle with the circumference of C = 1. The hub carrier’s one-stop
3Airlines use combinations of different types of price discrimination regularly, as they sell
travel products and services simultaneously to different market segments. There is also a large
volume of academic literature on price discrimination of this industry, e.g. Borenstein and Rose
(1995), Geradi and Shapiro (2009).
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flights can only be operated along a fixed schedule in a short run4, which is mo-
deled by n fixed points at an equal distance with each other along a circle. Both
carriers are able to choose an alternative schedule, which can only be adopted
for non-stop flights. This alternative schedule is modeled by another series of n
points, each of which is located right in the middle of two fixed points along this
circle. In the graph, this alternative schedule is interlaced with the fixed one5.
Each consumer takes one flight every week. Their preferred departure time x is
uniformly distributed along the circle. The cost to any consumer of substituting
a flight which departs at x′, for a desired flight which departs at x, is a strictly
increasing function of the minimum distance around the circle between x′ and
x, τ(|x − x′ |), where τ is constant and measures the substitution rate between
different flights’ departure times.
In addition, the feature of flight qualities available to the two carriers is charac-
terized as follows. The hub carrier has the option to operate a series of one-stop
scheduled flights as it owns a hub-spoke network, or to start a series of non-
stop scheduled flights along an alternative schedule instead. On the other hand,
the PTP carrier only provides non-stop scheduled flight services according to its
business model. Vertical product differentiation occurs as non-stop flights bear
shorter flying hours than one-stop flights. All the consumers prefer shorter flight
hours of a single trip, but they are heterogeneous in the way they suffer from this
duration. By tradition, this heterogeneity is captured by a parameter θ ∈ [θ, θ],
which measures different valuation of time cost incurred by a flight. The space of
consumers’ characteristics (x, θ) is represented by a cylinder C× [θ, θ] (see Figure
4.1 to 4.4 for illustrations). Consumers are distributed uniformly on the surface
of the cylinder with density 1
θ−θ , and are of mass M = θ − θ.
Competition for traffic flow is modeled as a three-stage non-cooperative game
with complete information. In the first stage, the PTP carrier decides whether
to overlap the hub carrier’s one-stop flights’ fixed schedule, or not to overlap but
to interlace with it. In the second stage, the hub carrier has three options: to
operate its one-stop flights along the fixed schedule, to provide non-stop flights
instead but still along the same fixed schedule, or to provide non-stop flights
4Though all the carriers change their route network from time to time, especially according
to the seasonal demand fluctuation, an overall route network can be considered as static for a
short period since carriers sell tickets as early as several months in advance of the departure
time. In particular, hub carriers provide one-stop flight services between two secondary cities,
which requires connecting flights through a third city. As the overall network is static in short
run operation, the one-stop flights schedule can be considered as fixed compared to the non-stop
flight schedule
5Figure 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the layout of interlaced schedule.
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along an alternative schedule interlaced with the fixed one. In the third stage,
both carriers announce their prices simultaneously. The sequence of moves is
made following the conjecture that the PTP carrier takes less time to determine
its product line position than its opponent, since it only needs to choose the
schedule while its opponent needs to choose both the schedule and the quality
of flight. The information of schedule is easily uncovered by the airport, so the
information can be considered as complete. Moreover, as prices are easier to set
than product line positioning, the strategic pricing interplay takes place in the
last stage.
Assuming the marginal cost equals zero, the two carriers maximize the profit
function, π = pijqij , where i ∈ {H,L}, and j indicates whether it provides a
non-stop flight, denoted by j = a, or a one-stop flight, denoted by j = b. Let ta
denote the flying duration of a non-stop flight, and tb denote the flying duration of
a one-stop flight. z = |x−x′ | denotes the minimum distance between a consumer’s
preferred departure time and the closest departure time available. The indirect
utility function for consumer k is:
vk = r − pij − θktj − τθkzk (4.1)
where r represents consumers’ reservation price, which is assumed to be large
enough to keep all the consumers active in the market; i denotes the type of
carriers: the hub carrier or the PTP carrier, i ∈ {H,L}, and j denotes the type
of flight quality: non-stop or one-stop, j ∈ {a, b} (a is for non-stop and b is
for one-stop). The business model of PTP carrier is to provide non-stop flights
only, while that of the hub carrier is to provide either non-stop flights or one-stop
flights. Hence, j = a if i = L and j ∈ {a, b} if i = H . The difference in business
models indicates that there are only three possible types of flights: non-stop by
the hub carrier, one-stop by the hub carrier and non-stop by the PTP carrier. pij
is the price of a type j flight provided by the carrier i.
The term θktj represents the time cost generated by the flight duration that
is exogenously-determined. Let δ = tb − ta denote the time saved by non-stop
service in comparison with one-stop service. Assume θ > 2θ to ensure that the
market is able to accommodate two different flight quality levels. The last term
τθz represents the overall substitution costs. This interaction term indicates that
the two characteristics of consumers, represented by x and θ are not independent
of each other. It comprises of substitution costs stemming from the distance
between a preferred departure time and the closest departure time available, τz,
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and that from the taste (valuation) of time, θ. Intuitively, it is not surprising that
those who have a higher valuation on time-saving flight are more sensitive to the
accuracy of departure time. In other words, these people with a higher valuation
of time-saving flights suffer more ‘transportation cost’ by an alternative flight
other than their desired one. The overall substitution rate τθ that is increasing
in θ captures this interaction between the two characteristics of consumers.
4.3 Equilibrium Prices
As mentioned above, the hub carrier has to choose flight quality (non-stop vs.
one-stop) and flight location (flight schedule), while the PTP carrier only has
to choose flight location according to its business model. The location choices
are restricted to two cases: (i) exactly on the potential one-stop schedule; (ii)
interlaced with the potential one-stop schedule. By borrowing the concepts in
Klemperer (1992), the possible product line location layout is at either of the two
polar: head-to-head or interlaced. By head-to-head product lines, both carriers
provide n flights per week at the same time slots, e.g. located at x = m/n,
m = 1, 2, 3...n. By interlaced product lines, one of the two carriers provides n
flights per week at the locations x = m/n, m = 1, 2, 3...n and the other carrier
provides n flights at the locations x = (m− 1
2
)/n, m = 1, 2, 3...n. Given the first
two stages’ decisions on the product location and quality, four types of subgame
occur in the last stage:
• The hub carrier provides non-stop flights to compete with the PTP carrier
along the same schedule, namely head-to-head homogeneous product line
competition (see Figure 4.1 for illustration), hereafter HHO;
• The hub carrier provides one-stop flights and the PTP carrier provides non-
stop flights along the same schedule, namely head-to-head heterogeneous
product line competition (see Figure 4.2 for illustration), hereafter HHE;
• The hub carrier chooses a schedule interlaced with that adopted by the PTP
carrier, and both carriers provide non-stop flights, namely interlaced homo-
geneous product line competition (see Figure 4.3 for illustration), hereafter
IHO.
• The hub carrier provides one-stop flights along a schedule interlaced with
that adopted by the PTP carrier who provides non-stop flights, namely
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Figure 4.1: Head-to-head homogeneous product line competition
The concepts head-to-head and interlaced refer to the location dimension of
the product line (the alignment of schedules), while homogeneous and hetero-
geneous refer to the quality dimension of the product line (non-stop flights vs.
one-stop flights). Note that in the standard one-dimensional product differentia-
tion literature, these concepts are used to imply different scenarios than those
used in this model. It is straightforward to see that the equilibrium prices in
head-to-head homogeneous product competition would be zero, generating zero
profit for both carriers. Other than that case, there are three types of subgame
left to be analyzed in the following context.
4.3.1 Head-to-Head Heterogeneous Product Line Compe-
tition
With products located at an equal distance with each other, and no location
differentiation between the hub carrier and the PTP carrier in head-to-head com-
petition, this subgame is a case of the standard vertical differentiation model
with n equal-sized submarkets. The demand of each submarket is 1
n
(θ − θ). The
two carriers maximize their own profits by setting an optimal price, which is the
same for their own product line respectively. According to (4.1), the marginal
consumer who is indifferent between non-stop flight and one-stop flight satisfies













Figure 4.2: Head-to-head heterogeneous product line competition
where δ = tb − ta, θ̂ ∈ [θ, θ].
Consumers of type θ > θ̂ take non-stop flights operated by the PTP carrier,
and those with θ < θ̂ take one-stop flights operated by the hub carrier. The
demand functions are of the form:
qHb(pHb, pLa; δ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 pHb > pLa − θδ
pHb−pLa
δ
− θ pLa − θδ ≤ pHb ≤ pLa − θδ
θ − θ pHb < pLa − θδ
(4.3)
qLa(pHb, pLa; δ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
θ − θ pLa < pHb + θδ
θ − pHb−pLa
δ
pHb + θδ ≤ pLa ≤ pHb + θδ
0 pHb + θδ < pLa
(4.4)
The equilibrium prices as the solutions to the first-order conditions of the two









The superscript hhe represents head-to-head heterogeneous competition. With
the assumption θ > 2θ, both prices are positive in the equilibrium. The corres-










Under the assumption that the marginal cost for both carriers equals zero, the



















Figure 4.3: Interlaced homogeneous product line competition
This subgame describes the case when both carriers choose the same quality
of product, non-stop flights, to compete against each other, while horizontally
differentiating their non-stop flights by making an interlaced schedule so as to










≤ 0 if pLa−pHa ≥ 0, and ∂x̂∂θ ≥ 0 if pLa−pHa ≤ 0. The demand





















x̂(θ)dθ) pLa − θτ/2n ≤ pHa ≤ pLa − θτ/2n






(pHa − pLa), and θ2 = 2nτ (pLa − pHa). According to the stra-
tegic variable pHa, the demand function varies across five successive segments
represented by (4.6) (see Figure C.1 in Appendix for illustration).
The hub carrier would grab all the market share if it sets a price low enough
compared to its opponent’s as in the last segment, where qHa = θ − θ as repre-
sented by the last line of (4.6). On the other hand it would lose all the market
share to the PTP carrier if its price is set too high as represented by the first line
of (4.6). In the second segment of pHa (the second line of (4.6)), the hub carrier
loses the submarket consisting of customers with θ ∈ (θ, θ1) but stays competitive
in the rest of the submarkets. In the fourth segment of pHa (the fourth line of
(4.6)), the hub carrier gains the whole submarket share consisting of customers
with θ ∈ (θ, θ2) and faces competition from the PTP carrier in the rest of the
submarkets. In the third segment of pHa (the third line of (4.6)), the two carriers
stay competitive throughout the whole market.
The corresponding demand function of the PTP carrier is:
qLa(pHa, pLa; τ, θ, n) = θ − θ − qHa(pHa, pLa; τ, θ, n)
The two carriers maximize their profits, which generates two first-order condi-
tions. A symmetric equilibrium exists and lies in the third segment (see the






Here interlaced homogeneous competition is represented by the superscript iho.










4.3.3 Interlaced Heterogeneous Product Competition
Interlaced heterogeneous product line competition happens when the two carriers
not only vertically differentiate the flights (non-stop vs. one-stop) but also ho-











Figure 4.4: Interlaced heterogeneous product line competition










The location of the marginal consumer x̂ depends on the price difference between
the two carriers, valuation of the time cost θ, quality difference δ between non-stop
and one-stop flights and the scale of product line n. To compute the equilibrium,





, there is a unique equilibrium where both carriers grab a positive market
share in each submarket partitioned by θ, namely Horizontal Dominance(HD) by
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Figure 4.5: HD equilibrium
























x̂(θ)dθ) pLa − θ(δ + τ/2n) ≤ pHb ≤ pLa − θ(δ + τ/2n)
θ − θ pHb ≤ pLa − θ(δ + τ/2n)
(4.8)
where θ1 = (pLa − pHb)/(δ − τ2n), and θ2 = (pLa − pHb)/(δ + τ2n). The PTP
carrier’s demand function is:
qLa(pHb, pLa; τ, θ, n) = θ − θ − qHb(pHb, pLa; τ, θ, n)
Note that (4.8) differs from (4.6) in two aspects: the function form of x̂ and the
segments partitioned by the strategic variable pHb. In (4.6), indifference location x̂
is not determined by the quality difference δ since there is no difference in product
quality in the IHO competition. By contrast, consumers need to consider the time
cost of flight duration as the carriers provide flights of different flying hours in
this IHE competition.
The difference in segment partition from (4.8) to (4.6) indicates that given its
opponent’s price is fixed, the hub carrier has to set a much lower price to increase
its market share when it encounters IHE competition than IHO competition. For
example, in order to gain a positive market share, the hub carrier needs to set price
pHa ≤ pLa + θτ/2n if both carriers provide non-stop services and their schedules
are interlaced with each other, while the upper bound of pHa: pLa − θ(δ − τ/2n)
is lower when it provides one-stop flights along an interlaced schedule with its
opponent’s non-stop flights.
In this subgame, the demand function is slightly different in terms of the
segment partition when τ
2n




(see Appendix C.2). However it does not
affect the equilibrium outcome. A unique equilibrium lies in the third segment
(see the derivation in Appendix C.2) with the equilibrium prices:

















Note that HD and VD are valid only in the IHE competition, the superscript
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hd representing Horizontal Dominance indicates the type of this subgame as well.


















The corresponding equilibrium profits of the two carriers in IHE subgame HD






















Based on the equilibrium outcome shown above, the hub carrier sets a lower
price and earns a lower profit than the PTP carrier in HD equilibrium of IHE
competition.
Compared with HHE competition, the relationships between equilibrium prices
phhe∗Hb and p
hd∗









are ambiguous, which depend largely on exogenous variables, in particular, the
ratio of the quality difference to the relative substitution rate δ : τ
2n
, and the
extent of heterogeneity in consumers’ valuation of time, φ = θ/θ. For instance,
πhhe∗Hb < π
hd∗




that when the non-stop flight saves insignificant time compared with the one-
stop flight, the effect of substitution rate between departure time slots becomes
relatively stronger, so choosing an interlaced schedule becomes more effective in
attracting consumers. The same effect applies to the PTP carrier’s profit.
Compared with IHO competition, the hub carrier is worse off in HD equi-
librium of IHE competition. It earns a lower profit with the one-stop flights.
This is because that though it sets a lower price but gets less demand in HD
equilibrium of IHE competition than in IHO competition. On the other hand,
the PTP carrier apparently is better off in HD equilibrium of IHE competition
than in IHO competition, since it is able to set a higher price and grab a higher
demand while its opponent stays with the less appealing one-stop service.
Different from Horizontal Dominance equilibrium, Vertical Dominance equi-
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librium (VD) describes the situation where the hub carrier occupies the whole
lower end market share where θ ∈ [θ, θ2], splits a middle market with its opponent
where θ ∈ [θ1, θ2] and loses the whole upper end market share where θ ∈ [θ1, θ]
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Figure 4.6: VD equilibrium




. The demand function


























x̂(θ)dθ) pLa − θ(δ + τ/2n) ≤ pHb ≤ pLa − θ(δ − τ/2n)
θ − θ pHb ≤ pLa − θ(δ + τ/2n)
(4.9)
Again, θ1 = (pLa − pHb)/(δ − τ2n), and θ2 = (pLa − pHb)/(δ + τ2n) and the PTP
carrier’s demand function is: qLa(pHb, pLa; τ, θ, n) = θ − θ − qHb(pHb, pLa; τ, θ, n).
A unique equilibrium lies in the third segment where pLa − θ(δ − τ/2n) ≤ pHb ≤


















In the similar way, the superscript vd representing Vertical Dominance indi-
cates interlaced heterogeneous product competition in the context. Note that




























In VD equilibrium, the hub carrier sets a lower price but gains a lower market
demand than its opponent, which leads to a lower profit as well. Note that it is
the difference in the exogenous ratio of δ : τ
2n
that leads to different equilibrium
outcomes: HD or VD equilibrium in the interlaced heterogeneous competition.





depending on the value of φ = θ/θ (see the derivation in Appendix C.3).
When VD occurs, both carriers gain the same market demand in HHE and






La . But both carriers
are able to set a higher price in the equilibrium of HHE competition than in
VD equilibrium of IHE competition. The gap between the pair pvd∗Hb and p
hhe∗
Hb
or πvd∗Hb and π
hhe∗
Hb strongly depends on the ratio of the quality difference to the
relative substitution rate δ : τ
2n
, and the extent of the heterogeneity in time cost






La , both carriers
are better off in head-to-head product line competition when they specialize in
different quality of flights (non-stop vs. one-stop).
Proposition 4.1 Both carriers earn a larger profit with a higher price in equili-
brium of subgame HHE than subgame IHE when the quality difference δ is large
enough to ensure the existence of VD equilibrium in subgame IHE.
Proof See Appendix C.4.
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The intuition of Proposition 4.1 is as follows. The two carriers’ ability to
charge a price premium is increased by a larger quality disparity in both HHE
competition and IHE competition, because by staying apart further along the
quality dimension (flight duration), both carriers have relaxed price competition
pressure. This is a typical result in standard vertical differentiation model. Ho-
wever, the reduction in price competition pressure by a higher quality disparity
is weakened in IHE competition due to the influence of the second characteristic:
schedule (product location). The two carriers need to compete further in price
to win the consumers as they provide different schedules, which pushes the price
down. On the other hand, without consideration of the quality dimension, in-
terlaced competition also relaxes price competition pressure because by staying
apart along the schedule, the two carriers are able to sustain higher prices as
well. Hence, this is a matter of which characteristic is dominant in terms of
the influence on consumers’ choices. In HD equilibrium, the consumers place
more importance on their departure time preferences, indicating that they will
accept an inferior departure time slot only if significantly compensated by a much
cheaper price and/or time cost saving by non-stop flights (which represents their
valuation of quality). The two carriers find that by staying apart along the va-
riety dimension (schedule) is the better way to relax price competition. However,
as the quality disparity increases, the departure time becomes less important to
the consumers, and the two carriers prefer to relax the price competition pressure
by increasing their quality disparity to the greatest extent. In VD equilibrium, δ
is large enough so that flight quality other than the schedule becomes the domi-
nant characteristic to the consumers, which means consumers give more weight to
the duration of flight when making purchasing decisions. The two carriers relax
price competition pressure further by minimizing their schedule differences that
in return reinforce the disparity along the quality dimension.
In comparison with the IHO competition, the PTP carrier, as in HD equili-
brium, is better off in VD equilibrium of IHE competition as well. It is able to
set a higher equilibrium price and gain a higher demand in VD equilibrium. On
the other side, the hub carrier will not necessarily become worse off in VD equili-
brium than in IHO competition. As δ becomes larger in VD equilibrium, the hub
carrier is more likely to earn a greater profit by staying with one-stop service in
IHE competition as the price competition is relaxed due to the improvement of
its competitor’s flights quality.
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4.4 Product Line Decision Making
Back to the second stage, it is the hub carrier’s turn to make a move given its
opponent’s decision in the first stage. To simplify the game, any move leading to
HHO competition is omitted as it leads to zero profit and strictly dominated by
other forms of competition. Two types of subgames occur at this stage:
• Given that the PTP carrier chooses to overlap the hub carrier’s potential
one-stop flight schedule, the hub carrier chooses between operating its one-
stop flights, which ends in HHE competition, or starting a series of non-stop
flights along a schedule interlaced with that adopted by the PTP carrier,
which ends in IHO competition;
• Given that the PTP carrier chooses an alternative schedule interlaced with
the hub carrier’s potential one-stop flight schedule, the hub carrier chooses
between operating its one-stop flights, which ends in IHE competition, or
starting a series of non-stop flight along a schedule interlaced with that
adopted by the PTP carrier, which ends in IHO competition.
By foreseeing the hub carrier’s strategy, the PTP carrier decides whether to
overlap its opponent’s potential one-stop flights schedule or not in the first stage.
In the second stage, the hub carrier compares the profit from IHO competition
and that from HHE competition if the PTP carrier chooses overlapping strategy
(πihoHa vs. π
hhe
Hb ). It compares the profit from IHO competition and that from IHE
competition if the PTP carrier chooses interlacing strategy (πihoHa vs. π
hd
Hb, if HD
equilibrium occurs in subgame IHE, or πihoHa vs. π
vd
Hb if VD equilibrium occurs).
Since IHE competition generates different equilibrium outcomes under different
values of exogenous variables, which affects the hub carrier’s decision in the se-
cond stage and further impacts on the PTP carrier’s decision in the first stage,
it is necessary to divide the following analysis into two parts distinguished by
whether HD or VD prevails in IHE competition. When HD prevails in subgame
IHE, the following pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria are presented
in Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2 Given that HD is the unique equilibrium in subgame IHE, the
following pure strategy Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria occur:
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(i)The PTP carrier chooses to overlap the potential one-stop flights schedule,
and the hub carrier provides non-stop flights with an interlaced schedule in equi-
librium, which is characterized as IHO competition.
(ii)The PTP carrier chooses a schedule interlaced with the potential one-stop
flights schedule, and the hub carrier provides non-stop flights with its own po-
tential one-stop flights schedule in equilibrium, which is characterized as IHO
competition.
Proof. See Appendix C.5.
Proposition 4.2 implies that when HD equilibrium prevails in subgame IHE,
the PTP carrier is indifferent between overlapping and interlacing with its op-
ponent’s potential one-stop schedule, because the hub carrier’s best response is
to provide interlaced non-stop flights anyway and it is always capable of realizing
this response in the model. Though there are two pure strategy Subgame Perfect
Equilibria, both of them end up with the same form of product line competition,
where both carriers provide non-stop flights along an interlaced schedule with
each other (IHO competition).
On the other hand, when VD prevails in subgame IHE, the corresponding
Subgame Perfect Equilibria are characterized as follows.




, where α is an arbitrary natural number














α1 the solution to the equation (4.10), α2 the solution to the equation (4.11), and
α3 be the solution to the equation (4.12).
[α(1 +
2φ
1− φ)− 1]γ1 =
2
3
(1 + φ) (4.10)
[α(1 +
2φ










(1− 2φ)2 = γ2α(1 +
2φ
1− φ) (4.12)
Proposition 4.3 Given that VD is the unique equilibrium in subgame IHE, the
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following pure strategy Subgame Perfect Equilibria occur:
(i)If α1 ≤ α < α3, where 0.197477 ≤ φ < 0.5 (the lower bound of α would
be α2 where φ ≤ 0.197477), the PTP carrier is indifferent between overlapping
and interlacing the potential one-stop flights schedule, and the hub carrier pro-
vides non-stop flights with a schedule interlaced with that adopted by the low cost
carrier, which leads to IHO competition.
(ii)If α > α3, the PTP carrier chooses to overlap the potential one-stop flights
schedule, and the hub carrier provides one-stop flights with the same schedule,
which leads to HHE competition.
Proof. See Appendix C.6.
Case (i) in Proposition 4.3 says that there are two Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibria when α is low enough, both of which lead to subgame IHO, while
case(ii) generates the conditions under which HHE competition emerges in SPNE
when α exceeds some threshold. Specifically, when the ratio of quality difference
δ to the relative substitution rate τ
2n
is low enough, IHO competition occurs in
SPNE. The intuition is as follows. Given a constant relative substitution rate,
τ
2n
, lower δ makes the consumers give more weight to the desirability of the
departure time. The hub carrier finds it is optimal to relax the price competition
by maximizing the location disparity while minimizing the quality disparity with
its opponent. No matter if the PTP carrier chooses overlapping strategy or not,
the hub carrier’s best response is to interlace with the PTP carrier’s schedule and
provide the same quality flights. In addition, given a constant quality difference
δ, a higher absolute substitution rate τ or a lower measure of the product line
scale n has the same effect with regard to increasing consumers’ weight on the
desirability of the departure time.
By contrast, when the ratio of quality difference δ to the relative substitution
rate τ
2n
exceeds some threshold, consumers would put more weight on the quality
dimension of flights. The hub carrier would find that it is optimal to stay with
its one-stop flights to relax the price competition with its opponent along the
quality dimension. Foreseeing the hub carrier’s response, the PTP carrier chooses
to overlap the hub carriers’ one-stop flight schedule so that it would end up in
HHE competition which generates a higher profit.
Proposition 4.3 and Proposition 4.2 reveal that IHE product line competition
is never going to occur in SPNE when HHE product line competition is possible.
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The underlying economic rationale is that both carriers are better off by compe-
ting head-to-head than being interlaced in terms of product line positioning, in
the case that they specialize in different quality of flights (one-stop vs. non-stop).
This conclusion is consistent with the results in Proposition 4.1.
The above results stem from the assumptions that all the consumers stay
active in the market and the demand is inelastic (everyone wants exactly one
unit of product). Hence if we relax some of them, e.g. θ > 2θ, the findings are
different.
When the assumption θ > 2θ is relaxed, the hub carrier is not able to set
a positive price in HHE competition since the market is no longer capable of
accommodating two different flights’ quality levels. It does not affect the results
in Proposition 4.2 where HD prevails in equilibrium. But in VD case, when α
reaches some threshold (α4, see Appendix C.6 for its definition), the hub carrier
chooses interlaced non-stop services against its opponent’s overlapping strategy
that leads to subgame IHO and interlaced one-stop services against its opponent’s
interlacing strategy that leads to subgame IHE. By foreseeing the hub carrier’s
strategy, the PTP carrier chooses to interlace with its opponent’s one-stop flight.
Hence, as HHE competition is no longer an option when θ ≤ 2θ, IHE product
line competition emerges in equilibrium.
4.5 Discussion
The model discussed above provides some insight into the strategic interaction
between a hub-and-spoke network carrier and a point-to-point network carrier
over flights’ schedule arrangement, flights’ quality choice and pricing in a short
run operation. Scheduled flights6 embody multiple characteristics. Two charac-
teristics are most important to consumers: flight duration and departure times.
Hence, two-dimensional product differentiation model better fits the competition
between passenger carriers than a one-dimensional framework.
Given that there is a sufficiently-large heterogeneity in consumers’ valuation
over the quality of flights that keeps all the consumers active in the market, the
two carriers end up in HHE competition if the quality difference between the
6The concept of a scheduled flight is in contrast to that of a charter flight. A scheduled flight,
also known as public commercial flights leave at regular intervals with tickets being purchased
up to the day of departure, while a charter flight is a private flight scheduled to meet the needs
of specific passengers.
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non-stop flight and the one-stop flight is large enough, where the hub carrier pro-
vides one-stop flights along the same schedule as is adopted by the PTP carrier
who provides non-stop flights. Conversely, if the quality difference is not large
enough, the hub carrier would provide non-stop flights along the schedule inter-
laced with that adopted by the PTP carrier who provides non-stop flights. When
the assumption regarding the degree of heterogeneity in consumer valuation of
quality is relaxed, the two carriers would end up in IHE competition if the quality
difference is large enough, where the hub carrier would provide one-stop flights
against the PTP carrier’s non-stop flights on an interlaced schedule. Intuitively,
it indicates that it is not always the case that the hub carrier would improve its
flight quality when confronted with the competition from non-stop flights provi-
ded by the PTP carrier. By staying with one-stop flight, the hub carrier may
relax price competition with the PTP carrier either along the same schedule or
along an interlaced one.
This model also provides insights of the product structure in air-travel market
from a new perspective other than the cost concern. Consumers value long-haul
flights more than short-haul flights because the former ones, especially those
crossing continents, are less likely to be substituted by ground transportation.
Accordingly, the reservation price of the long-haul flights is much higher than that
of the short-haul ones, which leaves enough room for the hub carriers to design
profitable one-stop routes in these long-haul markets. Hence, the co-existence of
one-stop flights and non-stop flights is more likely to happen in long-haul air-travel
market. Based on airlines’ general operation experience, one-stop flights through
a hub requires more seats to reduce the unit cost by taking the advantage of
economics of scale, while non-stop flights need less seats to increase load factor to
boost revenue. Following these facts, results of this model also have implications
for the demand of different sizes of aircrafts.
The model has a number of limitations. First, it only considers a short run
strategic interaction between two carriers. Flights schedules and prices change
frequently in the air-travel markets. A dynamic model may be better at capturing
the strategic interactions between carriers. Second, this model does not consider
the possible product differentiation and competition within a carrier. In other
words, there is no mixed product structure within a carrier that provides both
one-stop and non-stop services, so the cannibalization effect within a firm is not
taken into consideration either. It would be interesting to incorporate this internal
cannibalization effect into the analysis of hub carriers’ product differentiation
strategy in future research. Lastly, this model assumes an equal marginal cost
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set to zero for both carriers. Though this assumption may be somewhat justifiable
since both of the one-stop flights and non-stop flights have aggressively sought
out cost minimizing strategies, a more practical model would incorporate this
difference in cost structure.
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Appendix C
C.1 Equilibrium in IHO Competition
To prove that in the interlaced homogeneous competition, a unique equilibrium
exists in the 3rd segment of the demand function, this proof proceeds with two
parts. In part a, it proves that in the 2nd and the 4th segment, no equilibrium
exists. In part b, it proves that the equilibrium exists in the 3rd segment.
a. In the 2nd segment, pHa ∈ [pLa + τθ/2n, pLa + τθ/2n], the first-order condi-
tions for the maximization problem are:
∂πHa
∂pHa
= (pLa − 2pHa)[ln θτ






= (pHa − 2pLa)[ln θτ










if pHa = 2pLa, which is:
p2La − p2Ha +
3τθ
2n
(pLa − pHa) = τθ
n
(pLa − 2pHa) (C.3)
Let pHa = α(pLa + τθ/2n) + (1 − α)(pLa + τθ/2n) where α ∈ [0, 1], and
substitute it back into C.3. It has the following solution when α = 0:
pLa =
1
(θ − θ)(1− α)
1
4
[αθ + (1− α)θ](4− α)(θ − θ) < 0 (C.4)
If α = 0, pLa = −θ < 0. Furthermore, when pHa = 2pLa, pLa = − τn(12θ − θ) < 0
under the assumption θ > 2θ. pLa < 0 yields a contradiction. Thus, no equili-
brium exists in the 2nd segment where pHa ∈ [pLa + τθ/2n, pLa + τθ/2n]. In the
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similar way, it can be shown that no equilibrium exists in the 4th segment where
pHa ∈ [pLa − τθ/2n, pLa − τθ/2n].










La; τ, θ, n) > πHa(pHa, p
∗





La; τ, θ, n) > πHa(p
∗
Ha, pLa; τ, θ, n)
The profit function is concave when pHa ∈ [pLa − τθ/2n, pLa − τθ/2n], which
covers the whole 3rd and 4th segment. Thus, if profits reach their maximum in
the 3rd segment, no maximum lies in the 4th segment. Since πHa = 0 in the
1st segment where pHa is relatively larger compared to the 2nd segment, if the
derivative of the profit function with respect to pHa were positive in the 2nd
segment, πHa would be negative within this segment. Therefore, the maximum
of profit should not be lying within the 2nd segment either. The following is
to prove ∂πHa
∂pHa
> 0 when pHa ∈ [pLa + τθ/2n, pLa + τθ/2n]. Again, let pHa =
α(pLa + τθ/2n) + (1 − α)(pLa + τθ/2n) where α ∈ [0, 1], then substitute it and
p∗La =
τ(θ−θ)
2n(lnθ−lnθ) back into C.1, which would have the following form:
ln
θτ
ατθ + (1− α)τθ +
α(θ − θ)(lnθ − lnθ)
θ − θ + (2αθ − 2αθ + 2θ)(lnθ − lnθ) = 0 (C.5)
Note that when α = 0, C.5= 0, and when α = 1, C.5> 0. Thus, if ∂C.5
∂α
> 0,
C.5 > 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1]. That is ∂C.5
∂α
> 0 iff:
Δ[Δ(1− 2αlnΦ) + 2θlnΦ]2 − (2θΔln2Φ+Δ2lnΦ)(θ −Δα) > 0 (C.6)
where Δ = θ − θ, Φ = θ/θ.
The minimum of the LHS of C.6 is:
7Δ2 − 4θ2ln2Φ + 12ΔθlnΦ (C.7)
C.7> 0 iff lnΦ < 7
2
(1 − Φ) is fulfilled, which requires Φ > 1 and that is
true in the context. Thus, C.6 exists, which proves ∂πHa
∂pHa
> 0 when pHa ∈
[pLa + τθ/2n, pLa + τθ/2n]. The proof for the maximum of profit not lying in
the 2nd segment is then complete.
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In short, part b implies that πHa has a global maximum in the interior of the




La; τ, θ, n) >
πHa(p
∗
Ha, pLa; τ, θ, n).
C.2 Equilibrium in IHE Competition HD Case
The demand function for the hub carrier’s one-stop service in interlaced hetero-
geneous competition is of the form when τ
2n

























x̂(θ)dθ) pLa − θ(δ + τ/2n) ≤ pHb ≤ pLa − θ(δ + τ/2n)
θ − θ pHb ≤ pLa − θ(δ + τ/2n)
(C.8)
In HD case of interlaced heterogeneous competition, the profit function is
continuous across five successive segments of the demand function. Consider the
hub carrier’s profit function first. The profit function is concave in the 3rd and
4th segment of demand function. Given any value of the PTP carrier’s price
phdLa ∈ [0,+∞], it can be shown that πhdHb is quasi-concave in pHa across these
five successive segments, which guarantees that it has a unique maximum with
respect to pHa. Thus, so long as this global maximum occurs in the 3rd segment,
the corresponding price is the best response of the hub carrier to its opponent,
which requires that pLa − θ(δ + τ/2n) ≤ p∗Hb ≤ pLa − θ(δ − τ/2n) when δ < τ2n ,
or pLa − θ(δ + τ/2n) ≤ p∗Hb ≤ pLa − θ(δ − τ/2n) when τ2n ≤ δ < θ+θθ−θ τ2n . The
requirement on the PTP carrier’s price p∗La as the best response to p
∗
Hb in the
price game can be deducted in the similar way. To sum up, the prices that lead
























Substitute phd∗Hb = (θ− θ)( τ2n − δ3)ln−1 θθ and phd∗La = (θ− θ)( τ2n + δ3)ln−1 θθ back into
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1−φλ < 1 0 < φ < 0.148999
1 ≤ φλ




λ−1 0.148999 ≤ φ < 1 + 2φ1−φ < 0.197477
0 < λ
λ−1 ≤ φλ1−φλ ≤ 1 + 2φ1−φ 0.197477 ≤ φ < 0.466411
φλ
1−φλ < 0 φ > 0.466411
(C.14)
Based on the above, the following regions partitioned by the relationship bet-
ween δ and τ/2n are generated, which guarantees the existence of the unique












0.197477 ≤ φ < 0.5
(C.15)
Note that when φ = 0.197477, we have φλ
1−φλ = 1 +
2φ
1−φ . Hence, as long as





. But when φ = 0.197477, either φλ
1−φλ or
λ
λ−1 is less than 1 +
2φ
1−φ ,

















, no equilibrium exists in subgame IHE. So we are not
able to investigate the overall SPNE in that parameter region.
C.3 Equilibrium in IHE Competition VD Case
In the same way as the HD case, it can be shown that the profit function is
continuous and quasi-concave in price, thus there exists a unique equilibrium.
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The prices generated by FOCs. are the equilibrium prices iff they belong to the
3rd segment of demand function, which requires the following inequality to be
fulfilled:
θ(δ + τ/2n) ≤ p∗La − p∗Hb ≤ θ(δ − τ/2n) (C.16)
This inequality can not be solved, yielding an implicit inequality. However, it
is possible to characterize the regions where VD equilibrium exists.




, where again, φ = θ/θ. . let




), where α is an arbitrary constant and α ≥ 1. δ takes the lowest










(2θ − θ)ln−1 δ+ τ2n
δ− τ
2n




























(C.17) is generated from LHS of (C.16), while (C.18) is generated from RHS of
(C.16). It can be shown that RHS of (C.17)is increasing in α and RHS of (C.18)
is decreasing in α. Thus, if (C.17) is fulfilled at the lowest value of α, it can be
held for all α ∈ [1,∞); in the same way, if (C.18) is fulfilled at α = 1, it can be


















(C.19) and (C.20) can not be fulfilled at the same time unless φ = 0.197477. In
particular, when 0 < φ < 0.197477, only (C.18) is fulfilled for all α, so additional
requirement on δ and τ
2n
is generated by (C.17); when 0.197477 < φ < 0.5, only
(C.17) is fulfilled for all α, additional requirement on δ and τ
2n
is then generated
by (C.18). In general, the additional requirement generates α ≥ g(φ) > 1 when




< δ < g(φ) τ
2n
, no equilibrium
exists in subgame IHE. So we are not able to investigate the overall SPNE in that
region.
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C.4 Proof of Proposition 4.1







La because the demand for the hub carrier’s one-
stop service and the PTP carrier’s non-stop service in subgame HHE equals their
counterparts in VD equilibrium of subgame IHE respectively. Recall that in VD




, φ = θ
θ


















































Given any pair of α ∈ [1,∞) and φ ∈ (0, 1
2






> 1, and since the demand shares in equilibrium of HHE competition and







> 1. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 4.2
To prove Proposition 4.2, we need to find out whether the hub carrier would
choose to provide non-stop flight services or one-stop flight services in each sub-
game at the 2nd stage. This proof proceeds with two cases according to the
separate region of φ.








1−φ . In the subgame
following the PTP carrier’s decision of overlapping the hub carrier’s potential
one-stop flight schedule, we need to compare the respective payoff of the hub























(1− 2φ)2 > 1
(C.23)
Thus, πiho∗Ha > π
hhe∗
Ha , which indicates that the hub carrier would choose non-
stop services to interlace with the PTP carrier’s services. In the second subgame
following the PTP carrier’s decision of interlacing with its opponent’s potential
















































> 1, the hub carrier would rather start a series of non-stop
flights interlacing with its opponents’ services, which is characterized as IHO
competition.






















+ φ− 1)(1− φ)2
φln2 1
φ
(1− 2φ)2 > 1
(C.26)



































> 1. To sum up, no matter if 0 < φ < 0.19477 or 0.19477 ≤
φ < 0.5, the hub carrier chooses to interlace with the PTP carrier by providing
non-stop services in each subgame at the 2nd stage, which ends up with the
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IHO competition in the final stage of the game. Thus, the PTP carrier would
be indifferent between overlapping and interlacing with its opponent’s potential
one-stop flight schedule as described by Proposition2. This completes the proof.
C.6 Proof of Proposition 4.3
To prove Proposition 4.3 which characterizes the SPNE when VD prevails in
subgame IHE, we should first investigate the hub carrier’s decision at the 2nd
stage. In the subgame following the overlapping strategy of the PTP carrier at
the 1st stage, the hub carrier needs to compare its payoffs of providing interlaced














Let α3 be the solution to
πiho∗Ha
πhhe∗Hb
= 1. Since ∂
πiho∗Ha
πhhe∗Hb
/∂α < 0, any α > α3 leads to
πiho∗Ha < π
hhe∗
Hb , and vice versa.
In the subgame following the interlacing strategy of the PTP carrier, the hub
carrier needs to compare its payoffs of providing interlaced non-stop services or













Let α4 be the solution to
πiho∗Ha
πvd∗Hb
= 1. Since ∂
πiho∗Ha
πvd∗Hb
/∂α < 0, any α > α4 leads to
πiho∗Ha < π
vd∗
Hb , and vice versa. It can be verified that α3 < α4. Furthermore, the
restrictions on α to guarantee the existence of VD equilibrium are: α ≥ α2 if
φ ≤ 0.197477 and α ≥ α1 if 0.197477 ≤ φ < 0.5 according to Appendix C.3.
Hence, the hub carrier’s strategy at the 2nd stage can be summarized as fol-
lows:
(i) α2 ≤ α < α3 when φ ≤ 0.197477 (the lower bound of α would be α1 if
0.197477 ≤ φ < 0.5), no matter what strategy the PTP carrier adopts the 1st
stage, the hub carrier would choose interlaced non-stop services, which leads to
subgame IHO in the final stage;
(ii) α3 < α < α4, the hub carrier chooses head-to-head one-stop services
against the PTP carrier’s overlapping strategy and interlaced non-stop services
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against the PTP carrier’s interlacing strategy, which lead to subgame HHE and
subgame IHO respectively in the final stage.
(iii) α4 < α, the hub carrier chooses head-to-head one-stop services against
the PTP carrier’s overlapping strategy and interlaced one-stop services against
the PTP carrier’s interlacing strategy, which lead to subgame HHE and subgame
IHE respectively in the final stage.
When case (i) happens, the PTP carrier is indifferent between overlapping
and interlacing strategy in the first stage because the game will end up with IHO
competition anyway. When case (ii) happens, the PTP carrier needs to compare













/∂α < 0 and the maximum of
πiho∗La
πhhe∗La
is less than 1 when α = 1. It can
be verified that πiho∗La < π
hhe∗
La . Hence the PTP carrier would choose overlapping
strategy in the first stage. When case (iii) happens, the PTP carrier needs to
compare its payoff in subgame HHE and subgame IHE: πihe∗La and π
hhe∗
La . According
to Proposition 1, we get that πhhe∗La > π
ihe∗
La . Hence the PTP carrier would choose
overlapping strategy in the first stage. This completes the proof of Proposition
3.







PTP carrier's market shar
xΘ
	






PTP carrier's market shar










Hub carrier's marke 
share
PTP carrier's market shar
xΘ
	










PTP carrier's market shar
Hub carrier's marke 
share









Hub carrier's market shar
(e) Fifth segment of demand
Figure C.1: The demand across five segments
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